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This thesis examines the manner in which Ronald Reagan
responded to the Tower Commission Report concerning his
involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair.

It explores the

following questions: 1) What were the factors leading to a
rhetorical situation as defined by the media and which
required Ronald Reagan to provide a public response of selfdefense; 2) what strategies of apologia did Reagan employ;
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and 3) how did the media and the White House characterize
the outcome of Reagan's speech?
Data for analysis were drawn from nationally recognized
newspapers that shaped public perception of the Iran-Contra
Affair: The Washington Post, The New York Times, Los Angeles
Times, and The Christian Science Monitor.

In addition, The

Tower Commission Report and Ronald Reagan's March 4, 1987
speech were used as primary texts.
It was found that the events of the Iran-Contra Affair
qualified as a crisis, and exemplified an exigence needing a
response.

The thesis demonstrated that the Iran-contra

Affair was an appropriate case for study as a rhetorical
situation.

Analysis demonstrates how Ronald Reagan made

full use of the conventional apologetic strategies of
denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence to
regain lost credibility; moreover, analysis provides further
evidence of the utility of genre criticism.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
He has been called the symbolic master--a man who
personified America's best image of itself, being identified
with the values of family, work, peace, and freedom (White,
1988).

Time once described him as "a magician who carried a

bright, ideal America like a holograph in his mind and
projected its image in the air" ("The Unmaking," 1986,
p. 2).

But much of the Hollywood glitter once enjoyed by

this "great communicator" was dulled.

Having once possessed

honored esteem in America's eyes, Ronald Reagan, 40th
President of the United States, temporarily lost the
position as most-approved leader by his involvement in a
foreign policy crisis first uncovered in November, 1986 and
commonly known as the Iran-contra Affair.
Before the Iran-Contra crisis, Reagan had been sailing
along with a healthy, positive second-term rating (as
determined by public opinion polls) of 66% when news of the
arms deal was leaked (Cosco, 1987).

At a White House news

conference on November 13, 1986, he denied the story of
trading weapons for hostages ("Criticism mounts," 1986;
Hoffman, 1986c; Weinraub, 1986a).
placate the American public.

This denial did not

By January, a Newsweek poll

indicated the President's rating plummeted to 40% ("Reagan's
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Failure," 1987).

Subsequent polls reported that a majority

of Americans believed that Reagan was in fact lying ("Is
Reagan Lying," 1987; "The Cynic," 1987; "A Distinct," 1987;
"The Culture," 1987).

More specifically, the press accused

President Reagan of lying about not knowing that profits
from the sale of arms to Iran were being used to supply arms
and materials to Nicaraguan Contras.

By denying knowledge

of past events, Reagan's credibility began to waver. 1
Finally, Reagan appointed a commission to investigate
the affair.

After a three-month investigation into what the

media labeled "Iranscam," the Presidential Review Board,
more commonly known as the Tower Commission, headed by
former Texas Senator John Tower, determined that the
"initiative became in fact a series of arms-for-hostages
deals" (Tower, Muskie, Scowcroft, 1987,

p. 79).

The Tower

Commission's report was devastating--a searing appraisal of
Reagan's presidency that threatened to shrink him to
irrelevance for the rest of his lame-duck term.

The report,

while not indicting Reagan for involvement in the arms deal,

1

Since the writing of this thesis, Oliver North has
published his autobiography, Under Fire, in which he speaks
candidly of the President's involvement in the Iran-Contra
Affair. North claims the emphasis on the diversion of funds
to Nicaraguan Contras was, in itself, a diversion to protect
the President. It is important to recognize that this
thesis specifically examines Ronald Reagan's March 4, 1987
speech through the genre of apologia, not by way of
administering culpability. This information was not
available to the public at the time and thus could not
contribute to public opinion. Therefore, it is not included
in the analysis of this thesis.
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portrayed him as a careless, remote and forgetful leader,
too indifferent to supervise the reckless independence of
his aides.

His Iran policy was deemed foolish and

counterproductive, and it was carried out unprofessionally
and perhaps illegally (Tower et al., 1987).
The President finally conceded his error, 2 but not
before his credibility was in question.

Ronald Reagan

delivered a nation-wide discourse responding to this foreign
policy crisis.

On March 4, 1987, President Ronald Reagan

spoke in defense of himself to the American people and the
press on matters known as the Iran-contra Affair.
Specifically, Reagan spoke in response to a crisis
situation, one that shook the foundation of his legitimacy.
The news media and the American people wanted answers.
Reagan publicly confronted the accusations directed at his
credibility.
dilemma.

Clearly, Ronald Reagan found himself in a

His effectiveness as a leader was questioned

because of his involvement in the Iran-contra crisis.

The

media's attention to the Tower Commission Report and the
Iran-Contra hearings continued to focus on Reagan's
credibility, and created a rhetorical exigence in which
Reagan was compelled to defend himself.

The Iran-contra

crisis can be viewed as a rhetorical situation within which
to examine the expectations for, constraints upon, and

2

The President conceded his error in terms of
responsibility, not in terms of blame.
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appropriateness of, Ronald Reagan's response.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the manner in
which Ronald Reagan responded to the Tower Commission Report
concerning his involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair.
Specifically, this thesis will examine President Reagan's
March 4, 1987 address in which he spoke in defense of
himself and his involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair and
seek answers to the following questions:
1.

What were the factors leading to a rhetorical
situation as defined by the media which required
Ronald Reagan to provide a public response of selfdefense?

2.

To what issues did Ronald Reagan speak in his
defense; and what strategies of apologia did Ronald
Reagan employ?

3.

Considering the answers to Question 2, how did the
media and the White House characterize the outcome
of Ronald Reagan's speech?

The reference materials I will be utilizing are first,
nationally recognized newspapers that shaped public
perception prior to the Tower Commission Report-specifically, articles from The Washington Post, The New
York Times, Los Angeles Times, and The Christian Science
Monitor; second, the Tower Commission Report; third, Ronald
Reagan's March 4, 1987 speech; and fourth, related news
articles that described and defined reactions to the speech.
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These materials will provide information about events
leading up to the crisis, the Commission's response to
Reagan's involvement in the crisis, Reagan's response to the
Commission's report of his involvement, and reactions to
that response.
It is the contention of this thesis that Ronald Reagan,
in his March 4 address, employed various apologetic factors
as a rhetorical strategy to regain credibility and favor
with the American public.

Personal observations and

systematic analysis of historical examples of political
apologia have convinced me that few presidents have utilized
the art of political rhetoric more skillfully and applied
the rhetorical strategies of persuasion as successfully as
Ronald Reagan did.

CHAPTER II
THE PUBLIC PERSONA OF RONALD REAGAN
The 1970s had been a time of turmoil for the United
States.

Government corruption, economic problems, and

foreign policy failures created a breach of trust between
government and the American people.

Watergate and Richard

Nixon's near impeachment was still fresh in the public's
mind.

Oisillusionment was widespread regarding the

political process.

President Carter declared America a

"great national malaise":
We have been shaken by a tragic war abroad and by
scandals and broken promises at home. Our nation
has seen a failure of leadership. We have been
hurt and disillusioned. We have seen a wall go up
that separates us from our own government. . • .
Our country has lived through a time of torment.
(Carter, 1976, p. 510)
The economic forecast was bleak.

The Christian Science

Monitor reported an undercurrent of discontent among the
public:
Not for years has there been so much speculation
over the economic situation. It carries a special
problem in that it involves inflation and the
threat of recession at the same time.
(Strout,
1979, p. 1)
We had a president who was charged by the American people
with failure to deliver.

President Carter was ineffective:

. • . in his support of the Panama Canal Treaty,
his initial support of the Shah of Iran, his
unsuccessful attempts to free the American
hostages, his handling of escalating inflation,
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his inability to prevent Castro from sending
thousands of undesirables to the u.s., his
inability to reform the social security system,
and even his failure to halt White House leaks.
(Martin, 1983, p. 16)
The lack of public faith in the functioning of government
and ruling institutions had created a "confidence gap"
(Lipset & Schneider, 1987).

The public needed reassuring.

A Hollywood movie star, who created in the American
people a vision of renewal for their nation, emerged as a
presidential candidate.

Ronald Reagan rode the campaign

trail with two intertwined myths, "hero of the west" and
"the glory that was once America" (Fisher, 1982).
Reagan identified with western heroism.

Ronald

In October, 1979,

Reader's Digest published a eulogy entitled "Unforgettable
John Wayne."

Ronald Reagan was the author of this piece of

prose that spoke of his and Wayne's companionship, their
common values, and their fight to keep "Communists" out of
the film industry.

Reagan stated that John Wayne "gave the

whole world the image of what an American should be"
(Reagan, 1979, p. 116).
Through this narrative, Hankins (1983) concluded, "the
personalities and goals of the two men seemed to meld into a
single heroic spirit" (p. 33).

What Reagan had attempted to

do was fuse the fictional movie image of Wayne into an
identification with the characteristics that personified
himself as a hero, one who would bring America back to the
people (Martin, 1983).

Reagan's image became the political
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embodiment of the mythic westerner (Hankins, 1983).

Fisher

(1982) cites Reagan's origins, his love for western
clothing, his pastime of horseback riding, his film and
television roles, his rugged appearance, and his personal
virtues of honesty, sincerity, innocence, optimism, and
certainty as aiding his image of the "Town Marshall."
Because of the turmoil, unrest, and uncertainties
experienced by the 1970s, it is not surprising that in 1980
Reagan was elected President of the United States. America's
fascination with Reagan had just begun.

Hankins (1983)

traces America's attraction to Reagan by exploring the
rhetoric of the archetypal hero.

Hankins argues:

Each sociopolitical era must have a human
representation as the embodiment of cultural
values. Although these heroic images are
archetypally the same, their style is determined
by social and political events of the moment and
those events which immediately preceded the
emergence of the hero persona. (1983, p. 41)
A dramatic demonstration of Reagan's heroic orientation
was his performance during, and following, the attempted
assassination on his life.
courageous and fearless.

His humor portrayed him as
Thomas szasz of The Washington

Post observed during this ordeal, "Mr. Reagan seemed to
possess all the virtues of the Western hero he portrayed so
often and so well on the screen" (1981, p. Al9).

In

addition, Ivie (1984) also acknowledges the hero persona of
Reagan.

He states, "A Presidential persona incarnates the

people's voice to lend a further note of rationality to the
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heroic call for a strong America" (p. 39).

Quite clearly,

it seems that the presidential choice of the 80s was an
attempt to align the individual with the image of a hero.
The national malaise of the 70s focused on material
conditions.

Consequently, the American public wanted to

elect a western hero to "act" out the role of an image that
reassured them that their values were being protected.
Reagan had cultivated the persona of the classic American
Western hero.
Fisher (1982) supports the notion that there is a
romantic strain in American history and politics and
proposes characteristics of presidential heroes.

He

correlates Reagan's rhetoric to this romantic tradition and
considers Reagan's chances of becoming a presidential hero:
Presidential heroes need to be romantic figures,
but they need to be more than that. A romantic
figure need only be an adventurous, colorful,
daring, and impassioned exponent of certain
American ideals, such as individualism,
achievement, and success. To be an American hero,
one must not only display these qualities, one
must also be visionary and mythic, a subject for
folklore and legend. The American hero evokes the
image of the American Dream, of the ways people
and things are when the spirit of America
transcends the moment, and her destiny is
manifest. The American hero is the symbolic
embodiment of this dream in a single person, most
predominantly, in certain presidents.
(Fisher, 1982, pp. 300-301)
Ronald Reagan came to the White House to conquer government,
not to endorse it.

Ironically, he presided over a

resurgence of trust in the country's political institutions.
The rebound in political confidence began with the public's
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expectation that Reagan would be a strong leader.

His

personality, whether natural or self-managed, communicated a
sense of pride in the nation and faith in its future.

By

the end of 1982, decreasing inflation and belief in Reagan's
personal abilities had reversed a fifteen-year trend in
waning political trust, despite economic recession (Citrin,
Green, & Reingold, 1987).
Reagan's effectiveness portraying a "hero image" has
been widely recognized.

Wills (1987) analyzed the

attraction to Reagan in his book, Reagan's America:
Innocents at Home, tracing the connections between the image
of Hollywood and the ideals Reagan brought with him to the
presidency.

Wills (1987) believes Reagan achieved an almost

magical rapport with the American public, molding them to
his personal moral vision.

Wills describes America's self-

image, nurtured by Reagan's myth, ideology, and special
interests.

He observes how Reagan combines his ideology

with that of being a hero:
Reagan makes this absurdity believable, partly by
believing in it so thoroughly himself. He
believes that terrorists will stay away from jet
planes if America acts like a cowboy . • • • He has
used his annual messages to institute a cult of
"heroes."
(Wills, 1987, p. 381)
Reagan personified the American dream (Berman, 1990).

David

Gergen, Reagan's communications director from 1981 until
1984, observed, "over time, he [Reagan] converted much of
the country to his own views and values" (1989, p. 28).
actuality, what Reagan changed were the country's images.

In
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The basic image of Reagan as president remained remarkably
unchanged from that of Reagan as Hollywood actor.

The

identity he had created in Hollywood merged magically with
his White House persona.
into the oval office.

The studio movie set metamorphosed

The major legacy of Reagan's acting

career to his role as president was his unique ability to
create the impression that his fantasy screen image--the
western hero, and all-American nice guy--was actually the
man himself (Metzger, 1989).

In essence, Reagan appealed to

American values by use of what McGee (1980) would label a
"vocabulary of ideographs."

Scheele (1984) supports these

contentions when he argues, "value appeals enable a
political communicator to identify with his audience, seek
acceptance of his ideals, illuminate his political
objectives, and promote his political ideology" (p. 53).
Scheele (1984) states that Reagan employed various value
appeals as rhetorical strategies to persuade his audience to
respond favorably to his goal of becoming the President.
McGee (1980) clarifies the link between rhetoric and
ideology when he claims, "ideology in practice is a
political language, preserved in rhetorical documents, with
the capacity to dictate and control public belief and
behavior" (p. 5).

For McGee, "the political language which

manifests ideology seems characterized by slogans, a
vocabulary of ideographs" (1980, p. 23).

Similar to a

value, McGee defines ideograph as a linguistic abstraction
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which is accorded general societal consensus.

Ideographs

are employed by rhetors to guide behavior and belief by
suggesting acceptable or unacceptable courses of action
(McGee, 1980).

Value appeals most often employed by Reagan

were: "family," "work," "a strong America," "peace," and
"freedom" (Scheele, 1984).

The values employed by Reagan

were used to identify himself with his audience in order to
establish credibility and rapport (Scheele, 1984).
Essentially, he tied the strength and well-being of the
nation to the pride and economic health of its "families."
Reagan's reputation as a communicator is almost
legendary.

His delivery, presence, and sincerity have been

cited by numerous authors.

The appeal of Reagan's vision

was broad, and was reflected in his personal popularity
(White, 1988).

Even those who rejected his political

rhetoric recognized his ability to give vision to American
ideals (W.F.Lewis, 1987).

Lewis (1987) observes that Reagan

convincingly does this through "story telling."

Reagan had

a way with telling stories to the American public that
transcended issues and focused on ideological images (White,
1988).

In The New Politics of Old Values, White contends,

"In politics, the persona--the role that a politician
assumes to communicate his conscious intentions to himself
and to others--is the starting point for success or failure"
(1988, p. 7).

As I have demonstrated, Reagan's success came

from his ability to play a role and tell his "story," a
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craft he had learned well in his former profession.

The

accuracy of those stories were often in doubt: yet, it was
the moral of the story, the value that was reaffirmed, that
endeared him to his listeners.
Reagan's mythological persona spoke to the values of
family, faith, and determination.

It was a theme that

resonated throughout his presidency, reassuring millions of
Americans that basic values were what was needed to make a
great America.

To some, his stories seemed diversions, yet

they were also powerfully appealing.

There is no doubt that

Ronald Reagan became the western hero America was looking
for to reassure them.

He was the mythical ideograph of what

the people believed they needed.
Americans with a renewed pride.

His persona identified
However, this mythical

persona was soon to be challenged.

The following chapter

details the events of the Iran-Contra crisis, the Tower
Commission's report, and the news media's interpretation of
President Reagan's dilemma which resulted in a tarnishing of
Reagan's hero image.

CHAPTER III
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
The Iran-contra arms scandal garnered banner headlines
for more than a year, examining one of the most important
stories of the decade and the challenges posed for the
Reagan administration in its final year.

As early as August

1984, former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane
formally requested government agencies to reassess
policy toward Iran.

The

u.s.

u.s.

was involved in foreign policy

issues that included not only Iran and

u.s.

hostages being

held in the Middle East, but also issues concerning Central
America and the war in Nicaragua.
It is not germane to this study to ask what series of
events led up to, and began,

u.s.

involvement, and

ultimately led to the crisis that shook the foundations of a
democratic government.

What matters is that government

officials, along with the President of the United States,
became involved in a series of events that were illegal and
unconstitutional (questions of legality and
constitutionality are addressed later in this chapter).
In 1928 Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis stated,
"the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding" (Olmstead v.

u.s.,

1928).

These men of zeal,
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in this case, the National Security Council, had taken
matters into their own hands, believing that they knew
better than Congress what was best for the nation.
The National Security Act of 1947 established the
organization for national security matters within the
Executive Branch.
Council (NSC).

This Act created the National Security

Its statutory members are the President,

Vice President, Secretary of State, and the Secretary of
Defense.

The President is head of the NSC.

The NSC deals with the most vital issues in the
nation's national security policy.

The National Security

Council encounters issues that are complex, and often
secret.

However, by statute the NSC is neither a decision-

making board, nor is it empowered to take action.

Although

its members hold official positions in the Government, when
meeting as the NSC, they act as advisors to the President.
The 1947 Act clearly states this advisory function:
The function of the Council shall be to advise the
President with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating
to the national security so as to enable the
military services and the other departments and
agencies of the Government to cooperate more
effectively in matters involving the national
security.
(Tower et al., 1987, p. 7)
From time to time, Presidents have invited department heads
to attend NSC meetings, which have included the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

Although closely associated with the NSC in the

public mind, the Assistant to the President for National
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Security Affairs is not a member.
by

President Eisenhower in 1953.

The position was created
Although its precise title

has varied, the position has come to be known as the
National Security Advisor.

Under Eisenhower, the holder of

this position served as the principal executive officer of
the Council who set the agenda, briefed the President on
Council matters, and supervised the staff.
policy advocate.

He was not a

It was not until President Kennedy that

the role of NSC Advisor took on its current form, emerging
as an important personal advisor to the President.
What emerged from history was an NSC staff that was
used by each President in a way that reflected his
individual preferences and working style.

Over time, the

NSC has developed an important role within the Executive
Branch of coordinating policy review, preparing issues for
Presidential decisions, and monitoring implementation.

Yet,

it has remained the President's creation, molded as he
chooses, to serve as his personal committee for national
security affairs.
President Reagan entered office with a strong
commitment to cabinet government.

His principal advisors on

national security affairs were to be Secretary of State
George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, and
to a lesser extent, Director of Central Intelligence,
William Casey.

The position of the National Security

Advisor was initially downgraded in both status and access
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to the President.

Within a six-year period five different

people held the position.

Robert McFarlane, followed by

Vice Admiral John Poindexter, held this position during the
Iran-Contra initiative.

President Reagan appointed several

additional members to the NSC and also allowed staff
attendance at meetings.

The size of these meetings led

Reagan to subdivide into smaller groups.

One, the National

Security Planning Group (NSPG), was more restricted but
included the main members of the NSC.

Each subgroup of the

NSC was supported by subsidiary groups called Interagency
Groups.

All were chaired by the National Security Advisor.

Oliver North became instrumental through his position as
Assistant Deputy Director for Political-Military Affairs at
the NSC.

In addition to North, key members within the NSC

"conglomerate" involved in the Iran-Contra Affair were:
Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of state for InterAmerican Affairs; David Abshire, former Ambassador to NATO;
William Casey, CIA Director; Donald Gregg, Vice President
George Bush's national security advisor; Robert McFarlane,
President Reagan's National Security Advisor until November
1985; John Poindexter, McFarlane's successor as Reagan's
national security advisor; Secretary of State George Shultz;
William Webster, Director of the CIA and former head of the
FBI; Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger; Vice President
George Bush; and of course, President Reagan.
For two years the National Security Council covertly
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dealt with the Iranian government and the Contra rebels.
This "private network" of skilled operators redirected
American foreign policy to a course that contradicted the
laws of the United States. 3

The entire enterprise was an

exercise in extra-constitutional activity accompanied by the
familiar "mea culpa--our hearts were in the right place,
even if laws were broken" (Berman, 1990, p. 13).
question arises as to how this could happen.

The

Explanations

arise out of the media: in essence, we had a president who
allowed this to happen by means of his incompetence,
stupidity, or cleverness.
In essence, the Iran-contra Affair was an "arms-forhostages" agreement between the
government (see Appendix A).
held in Lebanon, the

u.s.

u.s.

and the Iranian

In exchange for

u.s.

hostages

would sell arms to Iran, via

Israel, and later, directly to Iran.

In addition, monies

made from the sale would be sent to support the Contras in
Nicaragua.
In October, 1986, reports of an arms shipment to Iran,
for the purpose of exchanging arms for hostages, began to
surface (McManus, 1986; Omang & Wilson, 1986; Preston, 1986;
LeMoyne, 1986).

This operation became public when a

u.s.

cargo plane was shot down on Oct. 5, 1986, beginning the
broad outlines of a sophisticated operation that involved
Legislation prohibiting the CIA from using funds for
the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua had
passed September 27, 1982.
3
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Nicaraguan rebel groups.

As reported in

u.s.

News & World

Report:
An American-registered military cargo plane is
shot down over Nicaragua while hauling guns and
ammunition to the anti-Sandinista rebels. The
sole survivor, an American crewman • . . promptly
confesses that the mission is only one of many
coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency out
of El Salvador . . . . (Range & Emerson, 1986,
p.6)
Newspapers across the country published headlines such as,
"Shoot-down hits

u.s.

credibility" (Richey & Moffett, 1986),

and "Political fallout spreads from Iran-Contra revelation"
(Dillin, 1986).

The Christian Science Monitor, in its

October 10, 1986 issue reported:
The Reagan administration faces a growing
credibility crisis over the downing of a privately
chartered u.s. cargo plane in Nicaragua . • • •
The loss of an aircraft to Nicaragua gunfire
raises new questions about private American
mercenaries and their links to the CIA. (Richey &
Moffett, 1986, p. 1)

u.s.

officials insisted that the downed pilot, Eugene

Hasenfus, a soldier of fortune, was acting in a private
capacity.

Reagan administration officials insisted the

plane, which was loaded with rifles, ammunition, and other
military equipment destined for Contra guerrilla forces, had
no connection to the
1986).

u.s.

government (Richey & Moffett,

However, three weeks later The Christian Science

Monitor reported that the Reagan administration appeared to
be seeking limited accommodations with Iran, a move that
seemed to be a reversal of

u.s.

(Moffett, 1986a; Pincus, 1986a).

policy on antiterrorism
According to reports from
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the press, the motive was to secure Iran's help in gaining
the release of six American hostages held by pro-Iranian
Muslim fundamentalists in Lebanon (Moffett, 1986a).
President Reagan denied charges that he was involved:
Those charges are utterly false [italics added].

The United States has not made concessions to
those who hold our people captive in Lebanon. And
we will not. The United States has not swapped
boatloads or planeloads of American weapons for
the return of American hostages. And we will not.
. . . To summarize, our Government has a firm
policy not to capitulate to terrorist demands.
That "no concessions" policy remains in force, in
spite of the wildly speculative and false stories
about arms for hostages and alleged ransom
payments. We did not--repeat--did not trade
weapons or anything else for hostages--nor will
we.
(Reagan, 1986. p. AS)
President Reagan's credibility became questionable when
the media reported that a White House agency negotiated an
arms-for-hostages deal with Iran (Saikowski, 1986; Moffett,
1986b; Harsch, 1986; Osterlund, 1986; "The Supply-Side,"
1986; A. Lewis, 1986; Shipler, 1986; Reston, 1986;
Fuerbringer, 1986).

The deal was apparently made by NSC

officials over the objections of Secretary of State George
Shultz and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, and
without the knowledge of Congress.

In addition, there was a

report that NSC officials had been involved in supplying
arms to antigovernment rebels in Nicaragua (Moffett, 1986b).
According to The Washington Post, President Reagan had
ordered CIA Director William Casey not to inform the
Congressional Intelligence Committee of covert action
involving shipments of arms to Iran and release of American
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hostages (Woodward, 1986).

The activities of the NSC were

contrary to the stated policy of the

u.s.

administration

(Moffett, 1986b; Reston, 1986; "Many Laws Bear," 1986).
Until this incident, Reagan officials contended that the

u.s.

should not negotiate with terrorists.

Later, in a

televised address to the nation, President Reagan
acknowledged that the

u.s.

had sent "less than a planeload"

of weapons to Iran, but denied that they were part of a
hostage agreement (Reagan, 1986).
The media's attention to the arms-deal incident
continued to focus on Reagan's credibility and leadership
capabilities (Gwertzman, 1986; Hoffman, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c;
Moffett, 1986b; Pincus, 1986a; Saikowski, 1986; "What's
Wrong," 1986).

Major news publications persisted in keeping

before the public the failures of the President.

The

Christian Science Monitor's editorial writer, Joseph Harsch,
reported the following:
We have a President who has had to abandon a
policy of shipping arms to Iran--and admit it
publicly on nationwide television. His first
adviser, his secretary of state, has publicly,
also on national television, disassociated himself
from the policy. The leaders of his own party in
the legislature have largely disassociated
themselves from the policy. Public opinion had
failed to rally to his cause. • • •
This is the sort of thing that identifies the
absence of effective leadership [italics added].

(1986, p. 11)
That same day, The Washington Post printed an editorial
stating, "A second time Wednesday night President Reagan
tried to assuage concern over his handling of the Iran
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affair.

A second time he largely failed [italics added]"

("At the White House," 1986, p. A26).
Fewer than two weeks after President Reagan denied a
"hostage-for-arms-deal," the media revealed that money from
the sale of arms to Iran had been sent to Contra rebels in
Nicaragua.

Reagan claimed that he was "not fully informed."

The President then announced the resignation of key NSC
officials.

According to the media, the most serious crisis

of the Reagan administration was occurring:
Had he just admitted his mistake, Ronald Reagan
might still have retrieved the situation.
Instead, in the most critical public appearance of
his Presidency, Reagan insisted that his decision
to send secret shipments of arms to Iran was the
"right" thing to do. . • •
At other moments of crisis in his six years in
the White House, Reagan's impressive persuasive
powers have kept him out of trouble. This time,
however, the President may have been kidding
himself.
When the full account of the Iran affair is
written, it will surely be assessed as an enormous
blunder. What history is most likely to remember
in its judgment is the President's awful loss of
credibility [italics added] at the very time he
required it most . . . •
Reagan's power is slipping away so rapidly that
veteran observers wonder whether his Presidency
could wind up as crippled as those of some recent
predecessors.
(Duffy, Mullin, Walsh, Borger,
Plattner, Emerson, stanglin, Pope, & Chesnoff,
1986, pp. 12-13)
At issue was President Reagan's personal credibility, and
his ability to control foreign policy for the remainder of
his lame-duck term:
President Reagan is groping for a way out of a
spate of diplomatic problems that is embarrassing
the United states abroad and causing consternation
at home.
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Diplomatic observers voice concern that, without
a fundamental shift in style, the President will
not be able to function credibly [italics added]
in his final two years in office.
(Saikowski,
1986, p. 1; see also Dillin, 1986; Hoffman, 1986d;
Gwertzman, 1986; Johnson, 1986; Osterlund, 1986;
Pincus, 1986b; Shipler, 1986)
By stripping Reagan of his most valued asset, his
credibility, the Iran-Contra affair had suddenly taken the
political agenda out of Ronald Reagan's hands.

Now, for the

first time since he arrived in Washington, he could no
longer dominate the political stage, and he appeared to be a
diminished figure (Duffy et al., 1986).
A CBS NewsjNew York Times poll conducted November 30,
and reported December 2, 1986, indicated that Reagan's
overall public approval rating had plummeted to 46% from 67%
in one month.

It was the lowest rating for Reagan since

1983 and the sharpest one-month drop in approval of a
president's job performance ever recorded.

The poll

revealed that 56% of Americans disapproved of Reagan's
conduct of foreign policy.

Seventy-five percent opposed

selling arms to Iran and 58% were against aiding the
Nicaraguan Contras.

Asked to choose whom they trusted more

to make correct foreign policy decisions, respondents chose
Congress over Reagan, 61% to 27% (Meislin, 1986).
The American people were disturbed by 1) the
confirmation of arms sales to Iran in apparent return for
the release of

u.s.

hostages, 2) the news that profits from

the arms sales had been diverted to the Contras, 3) the
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emergence of Lt. Col. Oliver North as a key figure in both
operations and, 4) President Reagan's continued insistence
that he knew nothing (Moffett & Thatcher, 1986; Dillin,
1986; Meislin, 1986).

Reagan denied that he had

circumvented any laws, stating in a November 13, 1986 speech
that all cabinet officials had been informed of the
operations and that congressional committees were fully
informed (Reagan, 1986). When the White House revealed on
November 25, 1986 that profits of the arms sales had been
secretly diverted to help the Contras (Grier, 1986; Hoffman

& Ifill, 1986; "The Right to Trust," 1986; Weinraub, 1986b),
President Reagan was left facing the most serious crisis of
his presidency.

As reported in

u.s.

News & World Report:

The Reagan administration • • . is facing a new
firestorm of criticism over revelations that money
from the secret arms deal was handed over to
Nicaraguan resistance leaders. The moves were the
latest in a series of maneuvers to cope with the
most serious political crisis of the Reagan
administration [italics added].
(Moffett &

Thatcher, 1986, p.l)
Suddenly, the revelations of the Iran-Contra Affair loosened
the President's hold on the public and shook the very
foundations of the presidency itself.

Finally, on November

25, 1986, in an attempt to regain credibility, President
Reagan appointed three people to a National Security Review
Board to review the operation of the National Security
Council and to recommend corrective action.
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THE TOWER COMMISSION REPORT
The President's Special Review Board, commonly known as
the Tower Commission, released its report on February 27,
1987.

The report presented the first official public

disclosure of the Iran-Contra arms scandal.

It was given

weight by the men who signed it: former Senator John Tower
(R-Texas), former Senator and Secretary of State Edmund
Muskie (D-Maine), and Brent Scowcroft, a retired Air Force
general who had served under several Republican presidents
as a key foreign policy advisor.

Underlining the Board's

significance was the fact that President Reagan himself had
requested it to review the Iran-contra Affair.
President Reagan directed the Tower Commission "to
examine the proper role of the National Security Council
staff in national security operations, including the arms
transfer to Iran" (Tower et al., 1987, p. 2).

However, the

short deadline 4 set by Reagan for completion of the Board's
work and its limited access to resources inevitably made the
Board's report deficient (Tower et al., 1987).
The Tower Commission held weeks of secret hearings and
then filed a 290-page document quoting dozens of secret
communications among senior national security officials

4The

President's Special Review Board was commissioned
on December 1, 1986; their report was filed on February 26,
1987.

""
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(Cohen & Mitchell, 1989).

The orig.ins of the arms transfers

to Iran seemed clear:
During the Board's work, it received evidence
concerning the role of the NSC staff in support of
the Contras during the period that such support
was either barred or restricted by Congress.
(Tower et al., 1987, p. 3)
Clearly, evidence indicted the illegality committed by the
NSC; however, the evidence thereafter was contradictory and
incomplete.

In its effort to find documented evidence

illuminating the affair, the Tower Commission discovered
that within several days of the Iran-Contra leak, North,
Poindexter, and other staff members had begun to prepare a
chronology of the initiative.

What the Board discovered was

that in a 15-day period, this group had produced at least a
dozen versions of this chronology.

The earliest

incarnations were merely lists of events; the last edited
version was titled, "Historical Chronology" (Tower et al.,
1987).

After reviewing these documents, the Commission

reported:
At best, these chronologies suggest a sense of
confusion about both the facts and what to say
about them. At worst, they suggest an attempt to
limit the information that got to the President,
the Cabinet, and the American people.
(Tower et
al., 1987, p. 480)
The Commission concluded:
The effort, hamstrung by poor record-keeping,
produced a series of documents which are often
conflicting and occasionally far from what we
believe transpired. In short, the NSC
chronologies provide more questions than answers.
(Tower et al., 1987, p. 480)
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In addition, key witnesses refused to testify, the
Board discovered that evidence had been shredded, and
important materials had been classified "secret."

The Tower

Commission's introductory remarks stated:
As of the date of this report, some key witnesses
had refused to testify before any forum.
Important documents located in other countries had
yet to be released, and important witnesses in
other countries were not available.
(Tower et
al., 1987, p.3)
On December 12, 1986, the Commission sent notices to
Poindexter and North to request their appearance before the
Board (Tower et al., 1987).

Within four days, legal council

for Poindexter responded: "At the present time, Admiral
Poindexter must respectfully decline to appear before the
Board"

(Tower et al., 1987, p. 512).

The previous day,

December 15, Oliver North's legal council replied: "Lt. Col.
North has asserted his constitutional right not to answer
questions with respect to the subject matter of your
December 12, 1986 letter"

(Tower et al., 1987, p. 514).

The Board interviewed former NSC Advisor Robert McFarlane on
his knowledge of the President's involvement.

The Board

determined that, "McFarlane's various positions on the
question of Presidential authorization in August and
September, 1985 have made this question very difficult to
resolve"

(Tower et al., 1987, p. 484).

In addition, no evidence was obtained on the origin(s)
or disposition of money which had been deposited in Swiss
bank accounts.

Efforts to get copies of the letters of
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credit were fruitless.

Holders of the confidential Swiss

accounts had opposed requests by u.s. Justice Department
lawyers to examine the accounts, citing a 1973 u.s.-swiss
treaty (Emerson & Healy, 1987).

There was no confirmation

on how the money had been acquired, how much, or to whom it
belonged (Cohen & Mitchell, 1989}.
It seems unlikely that the Tower Commission could have
done the job it was charged with performing.

stumbling

blocks and inconsistencies seemed to be the norm.
President Reagan's "requirement" for a quick report left the
Board very little time to investigate.

Thus, the Board was

unable to obtain evidence to either confirm or refute that
North had destroyed documents.

Many questions were left

unanswered (Tower et al., 1987).

Even so, the report

faulted key members of the administration, individually and
collectively (Tower et al., 1987).

It criticized the men

Reagan chose and on whom he relied, and it questioned the
loose style of management Reagan employed (Tower et al.,
1987).

Few top administration officials escaped the

criticism of the commission.

Former National Security

Advisor Robert McFarlane, Vice Admiral John Poindexter,
Secretary of state George Shultz, White House Chief of Staff
Donald Regan, Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger and
Director of Central Intelligence William Casey were targeted
(Tower et al., 1987).

The report accused these men of

giving President Reagan bad advice, saying they had failed
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to grasp "the serious legal and political risks" involved in
the whole undertaking:
In the case of the Iran initiative, the NSC
process did not fail, it simply was largely
ignored. The National Security Advisor and the
NSC principals all had a duty to raise this issue
and insist that orderly process be imposed. None
of them did so. • . •
Mr. Regan also shares in this responsibility

[italics added]. More than almost any Chief of
staff of recent memory, he asserted personal
control over the White House staff and sought to
extend this control to the National Security
Advisor. • . • He must bear the primary
responsibility for the chaos that descended upon
the White House [italics added] when such

disclosure did occur.
Mr. McFarlane appeared caught between a
President who supported the initiative and the
cabinet officers who strongly opposed it [italics

added].
VADM Poindexter also failed grievously [italics
added] on the matter of Contra diversion. . . • He
apparently failed to appreciate or ignored the
serious legal and political risks presented. His
clear obligation was either to investigate the
matter or take it to the President--or both. He
did neither. Director Casey shared a similar
responsibility [italics added]. Evidence suggests
that he received information about the possible
diversion of funds to the Contras almost a month
before the story broke. • • •
Given the importance of the issue and the sharp
policy divergences involved, however, Secretary
Shultz and Secretary Weinberger in particular
distanced themselves from the march of events.
(Tower et al., 1987, pp. 81-82)

The Tower Commission Report makes clear the fact that the
Iran-Contra Affair constituted a pair of grievous missteps:
first, the covert sale of arms to Iran at a time when
official American policy continued to call for the isolation
of Ayatollah Khomeini, and second, the diversion of some of
the profits to the Nicaraguan rebels at a time when Congress
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had ruled out direct or indirect American government aid
(Tower et al., 1987).
Perhaps the most devastating aspect of the Tower
Commission Report was the picture it painted of President
Reagan:
The NSC system will not work unless the President
makes it work. By his actions, by his leadership,
the President therefore determines the quality of
its performance.
• • . with such a complex, high-risk operation
and so much at stake, the President should have
ensured that the NSC system did not fail him. At
no time did he insist upon accountability and
performance review • • . •
The Board found a strong consensus among NSC
participants that the President's priority in the
Iran initiative was the release of u.s. hostages.
But setting priorities is not enough when it comes
to sensitive and risky initiatives that directly
affect u.s. national security • • • • It is the
President who must take responsibility for the NSC
system and deal with the consequences [italics

added].

(Tower et al., 1987, p. 79)

Candidly stated, President Reagan failed in his
responsibility as President.

The confidence and control

that previously characterized Reagan were replaced by a
caricature of a man so distracted, confused, and so remote
that he failed to understand the implications of
implementing an initiative that would free American hostages
and reestablish American influence in Iran (Tower et al.,
1987).
The Commission's report faulted the National Security
Council's unwarranted power and the President's style of
management.

According to the Tower Commission's findings:
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The arms transfers to Iran and the activities of
the NSC staff in support of the Contras are case
studies in the perils of policy pursued outside
the constraints of orderly process.
The Iran initiative ran directly counter to the
Administration's own policies on terrorism, the
Iranjiraq war, and military support to Iran
[italics added] . . . • The result taken as a
whole was a u.s. policy that worked against
itself . . . . The whole matter was handled too
informally, without adequate written records of
what had been considered, discussed, and decided.
(Tower, et al., 1987, p. 62)
The political fallout from the release of the Tower
Commission Report was swift.

Lt. Col. Oliver North had

already been fired, and National Security Advisor John
Poindexter had already resigned his duties.

In addition,

key White House officials were removed: White House Chief of
Staff Donald Regan was replaced by former Senate Republican
leader Howard Baker (Cannon, 1987; Gerstenzang, 1987).

The

appointment of Baker was the first in a series of steps
executed by Reagan to restore confidence in his presidency
(Cannon, 1987).

In addition to Baker, Reagan selected Frank

Carlucci, former deputy director of the CIA, as his national
security advisor, to replace Poindexter.

Beyond the

appointments of Baker and Carlucci, other personnel shifts
gave the President a new White House spokesman, chief
domestic policy advisor, director of communications and
assistant for political affairs and intergovernmental
relations.

This shift in the uppermost level of the White

House staff provided Reagan a new cabinet for his remaining
23 months in office.

Even though some administration
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officials managed to retain their positions, the Tower
Commission report had weakened the entire White House
administration by their involvement, or lack of knowledge,
in the Iran-Contra scandal.
MEDIA INTERPRETATIONS
Leading news publications recounted the devastating
image of Ronald Reagan that was depicted by the Commission:
By any standard, the contents of the blue-covered
Report of the President's Special Review Board are
riveting . • . • It provides the most comprehensive
record to date of the bizarre origins of the IranContra mess that has all but crippled the
administration of Ronald Reagan [italics added].

Until a few months ago, Reagan had been the wonder
of American politics, an apparent master of
popular communication who had burnished the image
of the Presidency and impressed his own
distinctive stamp on the American political
tableau. . . .
But now, with the damaging revelations of the
Tower Commission report, chances are that history
will take a less exalted view of Ronald Reagan.
(Duffy, Mullin, Walsh, Borger, Plattner, Fenyvesi,
Healy & Sanford, 1987, p. 14)
Journalists gave opinions, and demanded facts; information
was leaked; damaging speculative stories were written:
However the spreading scandal and investigation
finally sort out, there seems little doubt that
the President has been badly damaged [italics
added]. Aides and outsiders alike fear the
scandal may have compromised Reagan's ability to
pursue even limited domestic and foreign-policy
initiatives • • . •
If that popular perception has been badly
damaged, it may count as the greatest tragedy in
the entire affair. . . . The current crisis seems
to have stripped Reagan of his near magical charm
and credibility [italics added].
(Duffy, Emerson,

Mullin, Borger, Walsh, 1986, p. 16)
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The day after the Tower Commission's report was made
public, the front page of The Christian Science Monitor
stated, "Beneath report's surface lurks the issue of coverup" (Thatcher, 1987).

On the same day, The Washington Post

reported:
The Tower review board issued a highly critical
report yesterday detailing how President Reagan
swapped arms for hostages as White House aides
secretly ran the contra war against Nicaragua and
top officials lied to each other and the public
while possibly breaking the law • . . •
Chronicling events that have badly unraveled the
Reagan presidency, the board • • • held the
president responsible for clandestine policy
toward Iran that was riddled with "inconsistency."
(Hoffman & Morgan, 1987, p. 1)
The revelations uncovered by the Tower Commission on
the Iran-Contra Affair did not force Ronald Reagan from
office, but they did profoundly affect relations between the
President and the American people.

A CBS/New York Times

news poll, conducted between February 28 and March 1,
revealed that Reagan's approval rating had plunged another
10 percentage points since the last poll had been taken 5
weeks prior (Dionne,Jr., 1987a).

The Iran-Contra Affair

changed the way the American people viewed the Reagan
presidency, perhaps forever.

The response from

Representative Newt Gingrich, a conservative Republican from
Georgia, poignantly addressed this concern.

In response to

the Tower Commission's report he stated, "He will never
again be the Reagan that he was before he blew it.
not going to regain our trust and our faith easily"

He is
(Apple
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Jr., 1987b, p. Al).

In addition,

u.s.

News & World Report's

journalist, Brian Duffy, expressed his views:
Even with the reorganization, a new White House
team and an aggressive public-relations plan to
strengthen the President's battered leadership
profile, many friends and foes believe that
Reagan's moment has passed--that after the damage
done by the Tower report, the consequences now
preclude any significant comeback.
(Duffy et al.,
1987, p.l5)
As the Iran-Contra Affair unraveled, President Reagan's
authority and credibility continued to crumble.

Reagan's

management style was detached from the details of
government.

But the President cannot escape responsibility

by stating, "I don't remember."

To separate power from

responsibility is to undermine the concept of democracy--and
that is what the Tower Commission had concluded.
The New York Times Chief Washington correspondent, R.W.
Apple Jr., wrote his commentary on the Tower report:
But it is not any individual finding in the report
that seemed most likely to damage Ronald Reagan's
ability to function as a vigorous and effective
President for the last 23 months of his term and
to cloud his place in history. It is instead the
almost pathetic picture of a man wholly out of
touch with a central episode in his presidency

[italics added] . . . • And of a policy so
convoluted and incomprehensible that some of the
charts illustrating individual transactions look
like Rube Goldberg cartoons, full of arrows,
boxes, circles, number and labels.
This is not a portrait of venality. It is a
portrait of ineptitude verging on incompetence

[italics added]. It is a portrait not of
inadequate institutions but of stumbling,
short-sighted stewardship of the national trust at
a moment of crisis, from the President on down.
(New York Times, 1987, pp. xv-xvi)
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Newspapers across the country continued to keep the
Iran-Contra crisis salient.

These same newspapers reported

the findings of the Tower report and their own responses.
The New York Times reported:
Mr. Reagan finds himself on the defensive,
pictured by the report as unwilling to involve
himself in the details of foreign policy and, at
least in the Iran-Contra affair, unable to control
his staff, unable even to remember when he
authorized what.
(Apple, 1987a, p.A12)
In addition, a February 27 editorial admonished the
President's lack of supervision over the nation's security:
There is no graver set of Presidential
responsibilities . • . • which commands that he
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
The Tower commission offers powerful reason for
believing that Mr. Reagan failed in that
responsibility [italics added] . • . . Mr. Tower
now says: "The President made mistakes." ("Fair,
respectful," 1987, p. A26)
With his authority already weakened by the months-old
crisis, the President faced an on-going challenge of his
leadership abilities and his trustworthiness, put forth by
the press.

The press focused on several issues:

Reagan's

detachment, a possible cover-up of Reagan's role, possible
law violations, and even Reagan's political survival
(Hoffman & Morgan, 1987; Johnson, 1987; Osterlund, 1987;
Ostrow, 1987; Saikowski, 1987; Thatcher, 1987).
The Washington Post published statements made by Edmund
Muskie, one of the three members of the Tower Commission,
from the CBS News• "Face the Nation" interview.

Muskie

stated the Commission was astonished by the fact that Reagan
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lacked any knowledge of the whole affair.

Muskie stated:

We were appalled by the absence of the kind of
alertness and vigilance to his job and to these
policies that one expects of a president. . . • We
do regard him as a president who didn't do his
job.
(Walsh & Cannon, 1987, p. A6)
Until the Iran-Contra affair became public, Reagan's
credibility was undamaged.

However, the CBS/New York Times

poll has shown how quickly Reagan's credibility, like
teflon, was chipped away.

More Americans disapproved than

approved of President Reagan's performance.

Half of the

public thought that Reagan really did know that profits from
the Iran arms sale went to the Contras.

Seven-out-of-ten

Americans thought there was a cover-up (Dionne, 1987a) .

For

the President's popularity to plummet 21 points in 30 days
reflects the loss of faith that was felt by the American
people.

There was, according to The New York Times, "a

sense of comeuppance on the left, of betrayal on the right,
of disappointment in the middle" ("Teflon," 1987, p. E26).
SUMMARY
Before the Iran-Contra Affair, Reagan could have
maintained his image by playing the role of a western hero
(White, 1988).

But Reagan acted contrary to his public

persona by involving himself in an arms-for-hostages deal.
Until that act, the American people believed Reagan was the
embodiment of an American hero, and thus, the embodiment of
all that was right with America (White, 1988).

Reagan's
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image was tarnished because he acted out of character.

The

crisis had rapidly spread far beyond Iran to, not only the
credibility of the President, but to the competence and
cohesion of his administration (Duffy et al., 1986).
In our culture, we insist that our elected officials
account for the power entrusted to them.

An implication of

impropriety that the public's trust has been abused
historically prompts a demand for full public disclosure,
even when it will prove to be embarrassing to the nation as
well as to its officials (Cohen & Mitchell, 1989).
In the past, whenever Ronald Reagan wanted to mobilize
support, he relied on nationally televised discourse.
Iran-Contra Affair was indeed one of those moments.

The
It had

become obvious that the scandal had created a deep distrust
and loss of credibility between the President and the
American public.

With the documentation I have presented,

it seems clear that the Iran-Contra Affair was a crisis of
confidence in the leadership abilities of the President of
the United states.
Ronald Reagan was in a dilemma.
leader of the country was doubted.

His effectiveness as
The media's attention to

the Tower Commission Report and the Iran-contra hearings
kept the public's attention on Reagan's credibility, and
thus created a scenario in which he was compelled to defend
himself.

The Los Angeles Times reported:

The President was so stung by the Tower
Commission's portrayal of.him as out of touch with
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crucial national security issues that he agreed
with some of his longtime advisers that he needed
to react quickly and decisively." (Nelson, 1987,
p. Al)

Reagan's challenge was to re-establish the perception
that he was back, firmly in charge.

To that end, his

response to the Iran-Contra Affair and to the Tower
Commission Report would be crucial.

On March 4, 1987 Ronald

Reagan addressed the nation to defend his credibility and to
explain his involvement in the Iran-contra Affair (see
Appendix B).

In the following chapter I will present the

theoretical perspective from which I will conduct my
analysis.

CHAPTER IV
UNDERSTANDING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
AS A RHETORICAL SITUATION
As previously demonstrated, the Iran-Contra Affair was
a serious crisis in the presidency of Ronald Reagan.

Until

the crisis, Reagan was considered one of the nations most
popular presidents.

However, Reagan had transgressed public

trust; the projected western hero image that had made him so
popular had become flawed.

President Reagan fell from the

role of hero into that of an ordinary politician.
American people had been duped.

The

The Iran-Contra Affair was

a "situation" in which something needed to be done.

Above

all, Reagan had to restore his damaged credibility and renew
the public's confidence in his leadership abilities.

The

Tower Commission report set a scene for Ronald Reagan, and
the public waited to see what, if anything, he would do.
The American people were eager to hear him confess his
transgression.

The action Ronald Reagan chose was to

address the American people and respond to the crisis
situation of the Iran-Contra Affair.
Lloyd Bitzer's concept of a "rhetorical situation" is
appropriate to conceptualize the Iran-Contra Affair as a
situation requiring a response.

An examination of the

historical development of this concept and the elements of a
rhetorical situation will provide the means to analyze
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Reagan's response as a speech of self-defense, and thus, as
an example of the genre of apologia.
The Rhetoric of Western Thought provides the following
perspective on rhetoric:
Genuine rhetoric occurs when a communicator
presents an informative or suasory ethical verbal
(written or oral) or non-verbal message
specifically designed to create a persuasive
effect in an audience comprised of readers or
listeners who have a choice or perceived choice
and the power to modify the exigencies upon which
the discourse is constructed.
(Golden, Berquist,
& Coleman, 1983, p. 5)
It is against this background on the nature and relevance of
rhetoric that Lloyd Bitzer suggests the parameters of
rhetorical discourse.

Bitzer proposed that the starting

point of rhetoric was in the situation.

Bitzer's essay,

"The Rhetorical Situation," suggests that we may
conceptualize rhetoric as discourse occurring in situations
where solutions are wanted and where the needs or
"exigencies" of the situation can be altered by discourse.
Bitzer (1968) defines a rhetorical situation as:
. . . a complex of persons, events, objects, and
relations presenting an actual or potential
exigence which can be completely or partially
removed if discourse, introduced into the
situation, can so constrain human decision or
action as to bring about the significant
modification of the exigence.
(p. 5)
Bitzer identifies "situation" as a basis for realizing
whether of not a response becomes rhetorical.
rhetoric as situational.

Bitzer treats

According to Bitzer (1968),

rhetoric functions in order to produce action or change in
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society.
Rhetoric is a method of modifying reality; the speaker
modifies reality by bringing into existence a discourse in
which the audience becomes a controlling factor to its
change.

Without a situation lending itself to a response,

persuasion, according to Bitzer, cannot take place.

To say

that rhetoric is situational means an event, or condition,
must take place before there can be a response to it.
then will the speaker's reply be of significance.

Only

As a

result, the event controls the way in which the speaker
responds.
Bitzer's proposition relies upon the situation as
inviting a speaker's response through application of the
speaker's method and creation of a discourse.

Prior to the

creation and presentation of a discourse, Bitzer (1968)
claims there are three constituents, or elements, that must
be present in order for persuasive discourse to take place:
a rhetorical exigence, an audience, and constraints.
According to Bitzer:
An exigence which cannot be modified is not
rhetorical • . • • An exigence is rhetorical when
it is capable of positive modification and when
positive modification requires discourse or can be
assisted by discourse. • • • In any rhetorical
situation there will be at least one controlling
exigence . . • it specifies the audience to be
addressed and the change to be effected. . . •
When it is perceived and when it is strong and
important, then it constrains the thought and
action of the perceiver who may respond
rhetorically if he is in a position to do so.
(1968, p. 6)
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The second element in Bitzer's rhetorical situation is
the audience.

Rhetoric, according to Bitzer (1968),

requires an audience that must be capable of changing its
actions or beliefs.

Thus, a rhetorical audience "consists

only of those persons who are capable of being influenced by
discourse and of being mediators of change" (p. 7).
The third, and final, element necessary in a rhetorical
situation are the constraints.

Every rhetorical situation

contains a set of constraints made up of "persons, events,
objects, and relations which are parts of the situation
because they have the power to constrain decision and action
needed to modify the exigence" (Bitzer, 1968, p. 7).
Standard sources of constraints include beliefs, attitudes,
documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, and
motives.

When the speaker enters the situation, the speech,

according to Bitzer, "not only harnesses constraints given
by situation but provides additional important constraints-for example, his personal character, his logical proofs, and
his style" (1968, p. 7).

These three elements of exigence,

audience, and constraints constitute all that is necessary
to meet the conditions for a rhetorical situation.
Although Bitzer's notion of the rhetorical situation
generated controversy (see Vatz, 1973; Consigny, 1974;
Brummett, 1976), other critics believed, as did Bitzer, that
contexts or situations call rhetoric into existence (see
Jamieson, 1973; Cherwitz & Hikins, 1986; White, 1980).
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Sonja Foss (1989) explains the difference between the
relationship of rhetorical artifacts and their contexts:
The relationship between a rhetorical artifact and
its context is a subject of continuing debate in
the speech communication field. Some critics
believe that contexts or situations call rhetoric
into existence. The situation presents a problem,
and rhetoric comes into existence as a response to
that problem or as an effort to resolve it. • • .
Other critics and theorists believe . • . that
events and situations do not call for rhetorical
responses. The existence of situations and how
they are defined depend on the perspectives of the
individuals involved. Thus, the meaning of a
situation does not exist in a situation but is
created by rhetors as they perceive and
communicate about that situation • • • . A rhetor's
perception of the situation, in this view,
constitutes the situation, and different rhetors
will perceive and define the situation in
different ways.
A middle view . . . holds that the situation
does not control the response of the rhetor, but
neither is the rhetor free to create a situation
at will . • • . Rhetors do not simply react to the
situation; they perceive situations and define
them through their rhetoric.
(p. 68)
Yet, Bitzer's concept continues to be useful for analysis of
situations calling for discourse. 5
According to Bitzer (1968), a rhetorical situation
focuses on the circumstances that lead up to a persuasive
discourse.

There has to be a reason, a situation, that

calls for a discourse to be delivered.

Clearly, the Iran-

Contra crisis became what Bitzer would call a rhetorical
exigence--a situation that required discourse that would
produce a change in the audience's beliefs.
5

It has been

For further study of Bitzer's "rhetorical situation"
see Carpenter & Seltzer, 1971; Brownlow & Davis, 1974;
Hoban, 1980; Hoover, 1989.
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established that Reagan's diminished credibility can be
linked, in part, to the Iran-Contra crisis.
demanded a response from the President.

This crisis

The American

people, White House officials, and the media all demanded
Reagan respond (Boyd, 1987).

Thus, President Reagan decided

that he "needed to react quickly and decisively" (Nelson,
1987, p. A1).
As I have noted, a rhetorical situation needs an
audience that is capable of being influenced by discourse.
Ronald Reagan's audience was the American public.

He

addressed the public on nation-wide television March 4,
1987.

It has been established that before the Iran-Contra

crisis, Reagan had an approval rating of 66%, by December
1986, Reagan's approval rating had dived to 46%, and by
March 1987, his approval rating had dropped to 36%.

The

approval ratings were based on a CBS/New York Times poll
(Dionne, 1987a).

The media's interpretation, and their

reporting of the events of the Iran-Contra crisis influenced
the American public's perception of the crisis.

Thus, it

can be concluded that the American public was capable of
being influenced by discourse.

Undoubtedly, the audience to

which Reagan spoke satisfies the second element of a
rhetorical situation.
Finally, a rhetorical situation consists of
constraints--who is the audience, what are their beliefs,
what do they know.

Ronald Reagan had to act appropriately
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to the constraints of the audience in order to redeem his
damaged credibility.

Reagan was constrained by: 1) the

knowledge of events (facts) already known to the public; 2)
the attitudes of the people; and 3) his past image.
The public's knowledge of the events of the Iran-Contra
Affair was governed by news reports.

Because the media had

reported the crisis, from the downed air-cargo plane in
Nicaragua to the Tower Commission's report of Reagan's
responsibility, Reagan could not offer information
contradicting the already available information without
further adverse consequences.

The American public also had

distinct attitudes concerning the crisis--they had lost
confidence in Reagan.

More than half the public believed

Reagan knew that arms were traded for hostages ("Is Reagan
Lying," 1987).
tarnished.

Reagan's past image of a "western hero" was

Thus, Reagan had to adapt his response to the

constraints of the situation.

Additionally, the media were

aware that Reagan needed to respond.
correspondent for

As Kenneth Walsh,

u.s. News & World Report, affirmed:

And above all, the Great Communicator must somehow
restore his administration's damaged credibility
and, if possible, renew the once mystic personal
bond with the American people that had made his
the first truly successful Presidency in a
generation.
(1987, p. 20)
Accordingly, it was concluded:
His (Reagan] prime-time speech this week presents
what may be his last opportunity to convince the
American people he is in charge of his floundering
administration. If he follows the advice of
congressional confidants and old friends from
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California, he will accept full responsibility, do
a clean sweep through the upper levels of the
White House staff and then tell the country what
he has done.
(Duffy et al., 1987, p. 19)
Thus, Ronald Reagan responded to the rhetorical exigence of
the Iran-Contra crisis by speaking in defense of himself
utilizing the rhetorical genre of apologia which will be
examined in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V
UNDERSTANDING REAGAN'S RHETORICAL SITUATION
THROUGH APOLOGIA
Ronald Reagan's response to the rhetorical exigence of
the Iran-Contra crisis can be classified as a member of a
genre.

A genre, by definition, is a method of grouping or

classifying speeches sharing similar characteristics.
Reflecting societal conventions and norms, genres are
intended to reflect how language is used in society.

The

term genre is a classification traditionally associated with
literary criticism.
Literary genres can be traced back to Aristotle's
Poetics: "Let us here deal with Poetry, its essence and its
several species, with the characteristic function of each
species . • • 11 (Aristotle, 1973, p. 5).

Aristotle proposed

criteria by which poetic genres could be classified.
Much later, in 1965, a generic approach to rhetorical
criticism received its first endorsement with the appearance
of Edwin Black's influential book, Rhetorical Criticism: A
study in Method.

Even though Black did not present a

detailed definition of genre, he used it to describe groups
of rhetorical discourses that shared similar strategies,
situations, and effects (Black, 1965).

Black recognized a

limitation in nee-Aristotelian thought, and proposed an
alternative generic perspective: 1) "there is a limited
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number of situations in which a rhetor can find himself;" 2)
"there is a limited number of ways in which a rhetor can and
will respond rhetorically to any given situational type;" 3)
"the recurrence of a given situational type through history
will provide the critic with information on the rhetorical
responses available in that situation;" and 4) "although we
can expect congregations of rhetorical discourses to form at
distinct points along the scale, these points will be more
or less arbitrary" (Black, 1965, pp. 133-134).

Although

Black's beginning work on generic criticism was limited, it
was noteworthy for several reasons.

According to Campbell

and Jamieson (1978), Black's work:
• . • located clusters of discourses based on
recurrent strategies, situations, and effects; and
it revealed the weaknesses of the nee-Aristotelian
perspective as a basis for writing a developmental
history of rhetoric. For these reasons, among
others, Black's book was a precursor of the
explosion of unconventional critical essays that
appeared in the late 1960's and 1970's. (p. 14)
Lloyd Bitzer's concept of the rhetorical situation also
contributed to the development of generic criticism.

Bitzer

(1968) made a detailed analysis of the situational element
of rhetorical action.

He argued that rhetoric was

situational, that it is the situation that calls a discourse
into existence and provides a vocabulary through which to
describe the variables in "rhetorical situations."
According to Bitzer, similar situations generate similar
responses:
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From day to day, year to year, comparable
situations occur, prompting comparable responses;
hence rhetorical forms are born and a special
vocabulary, grammar, and style are established.
(1968, p. 13)
Another contribution to the development of genre
criticism occurred in 1976 when Campbell and Jamieson
presented their essay, "Form and Genre in Rhetorical
Criticism," at a Speech Communication Association
conference.

Campbell and Jamieson traced the beginnings of

formal and generic criticism, examined the relationships
between the concepts of form and genre, and made suggestions
for the role of a generic perspective in the total
enterprise of criticism.

They offered a series of

propositions about the relationships among form, genre, and
situation: 1) "Genres are groups of discourses which share
substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics;" 2)
"Formal similarities establish genres, and the forms
relevant to genres are complex forms present in all
discourse. • • they will be the forms that rhetoricians
ordinarily call "strategies"--substantive and stylistic
forms chosen to respond to situational requirement;" 3) "The
rhetorical forms that establish genres are stylistic and
substantive responses to perceived situational demands;" 4)
"A genre is given its character by a fusion of forms not by
its individual elements;" and 5) "Genres often exist in
dynamic responsiveness to situational demand" (1978, pp.
18-24).
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The specific genre I will apply to Ronald Reagan's
rhetorical response is that of apologia--the speech of selfdefense.

Apologia, as a rhetorical genre, is defined by

discourses in which individuals defend their character
(Kruse, 1981).

Aristotelian and modern communication

theory agree that one's ethos, or credibility, is a salient
source of effectiveness (Aristotle, 1954; French & Raven,
1959; Gold, 1978; Hoban, 1980; Hoover, 1989; King, 1985;
Ware & Linkugel, 1973).

Apologia is used when credibility

comes into question, and the accused responds through a
speech of self-defense.

Apologizing, however, is only one

of several options available in speeches of self-defense.
The rhetoric of apologia is appropriate when a person must
explain or deny their actions, assure the audience of their
proper motivation, reinforce in the public mind previous
impressions of their good character, correct their
"mistake," if possible, and, as a last resort, admit their
mistakes and promise to do better in the future (Gold,
1978) •
Apologiae have been used as examples of responses to
rhetorical situations since Bitzer (1968) developed the idea
of situations being the necessary element that calls into
existence a discourse.

Grounding in generic criticism and

the genre of apologia to explain the redemptive process of
defending oneself has been supported by several authors.
In 1969, Linkugel and Razak's article, published in the
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Southern Speech Journal, was a case study of the rhetoric of
self-defense.

It analyzed the rhetorical strategy Sam

Houston used in reestablishing his moral character
(credibility) when Houston spoke in defense of himself on
the floor of the

u.s.

House of Representatives in 1832.

Linkugel and Razak examined Houston's speech as a
"rhetorical instance" and argued:
Many men facing charges detrimental to their
character have felt compelled to speak in defense
of themselves. The specifics surrounding each
incident vary as widely as the times and persons
involved, but the speeches have the common purpose
of self-vindication.
(1969, p. 263)
Butler (1972), in her essay, "The Apologia, 1971
Genre," utilizes Rosenfield's (1968) constants of apologetic
discourse to analyze Truman's, Nixon's, and Edward Kennedy's
speeches of self-defense via nationwide radio and
television.

Butler asserts that "the success or failure of

these men in their efforts holds implications for future
rhetorical discourse" (1972, p. 282).

The purpose of her

study was to answer the questions: 1) "How was his [Kennedy]
apology like or unlike that of Truman and Nixon," and 2)
"Why did he [Kennedy] seemingly fail when they succeeded;"
and to speculate on the form of future apologia.
Gold's (1978) essay, "Political Apologia: The Ritual of
Self-Defense," asserts that aspiring Presidents, and
presidential candidates, can be successful or unsuccessful
depending on their ability to practice the ritual of selfdefense.

In addition, Gold discusses the role of the media
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in issues of campaign coverage.

According to Gold,

candidates are highly susceptible to the scrutiny of media
attacks, and thus have been forced to respond publicly
through apologia in order to justify motives and defend
credibility.

Faced with the dramatic event which focuses

attention on character instead of policy issues, the
candidate must protect his or her reputation by countering
the potentially damaging charges.
Kruse (1981) agrees that apologia exists as a
rhetorical genre and that apologiae are discourses in which
individuals defend their characters.

Her essay, "The Scope

of Apologetic Discourse: Establishing Generic Parameters,"
attempts to establish boundaries of apologia genre in order
to assist critics in testing apologetic discourses more
effectively.

According to Kruse, "the first step in any

exercise of generic criticism is the establishment of the
parameters of the genre in which the items to be scrutinized
are to be located" (p. 290).

Kruse asserts that apologia is

discourse produced in response to an actual situation where
an individual's credibility has been attacked, and that the
exigence leading to the apology occurs within an observable
environment.

The speaker's motive is thus a "repair of

reputation."
Blair (1984), in her essay, "From 'All the President's
Men' to Every Man for Himself: The Strategies of PostWatergate Apologia," determined that characteristics
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attributed to apologia discourse were present in the
Watergate autobiographies that she analyzed.

She described

the rhetorical situation to see what constraints the authors
were placed in to discover how they had shaped apologia.
WARE AND LINKUGEL
Apologia theory has cultivated strategies used in
rebuilding a person's character.

Ronald Reagan seems to

have been put in a similar position in defending his
character in response to his involvement in the Iran-Contra
Affair.
Ware and Linkugel (1973) assert that speeches of selfdefense, apologetical discourse, constitute a distinct form
of public address, so as to warrant a rhetorical genre of
its own.

They examined speeches resulting from occasions

where speakers spoke in their own defense in order to
discover factors which characterize the apologetic form-that of denial, bolstering, differentiation, and
transcendence.

Ware and Linkugel adapted their four factors

from earlier concepts identified by Abelson (1959) as "modes
of resolution" of "belief dilemmas."
The first factor of verbal self-defense is denial.
According to Ware and Linkugel, denial consists of:
• • • the simple disavowal by the speaker of any
participation in, relationship to, or positive
sentiment toward whatever it is that repels the
audience. • . .
one may deny the alleged facts, sentiments,
objects, or relationships • • • • Strategies of
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denial are obviously useful to the speaker only to
the extent that such negations do not constitute a
known distortion of reality or to the point that
they conflict with other beliefs held by the
audience.
(1973, pp. 275-276)
In other words, a person may deny the facts, introducing a
different version; a person may give more information, "the
whole story," essentially denying that previous information
was sufficient to arrive at a conclusion.

In addition,

speeches of apology may rely upon the "denial of
intentions," arguing that the action was misunderstood or
misinterpreted in order to achieve affective change in the
audience.

Ware and Linkugel (1973) believe:

The person who is charged with some despicable
action often finds a disclaimer of intent as an
attractive means of escaping stigma if the denial
of the existence of the action itself is too great
a reformation of reality to gain acceptance.
(p 276)
The speaker assumes the position of one who is acted upon
rather than one who acts with intent.

In other words, he or

she is an innocent bystander or a victim of circumstances.
The bolstering factor can be thought of as being
parallel to that of denial.

Bolstering refers to "any

rhetorical strategy which reinforces the existence of a
fact, sentiment, object, or relationship" (Ware & Linkugel,
1973, p. 277).

Bolstering strategies involve reminding the

audience of previous occasions in which the accused was
viewed favorably by the audience.

Bolstering, like denial,

is reformative in the sense that the speaker does not
totally invent the identification, or try to change the
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audience's attitude toward those things with which the
speaker can identify, but tries to put an end to, or improve
the situation by change; the speaker removes the fault or
abuse of the situation.

In the case of bolstering

strategies, the accused is limited to some extent by the
reality the audience already perceives.
Bolstering and denial, according to Ware and Linkugel
(1973), are factors vital to the apologetic form of public
address.

Denial is a means of negation; bolstering is a

basis for identification.

And finally, according to Ware

and Linkugel (1973), "strategies of bolstering and denial
are reformative in the sense that they do not alter the
audience's meaning for the cognitive elements involved" (p.
278).

In other words, the speaker attempts to "reform" by

putting an end to or removing the faults andjor abuses with
which he or she is charged.
Differentiation, the third factor in apologetic
discourse "subsumes those strategies which serve the purpose
of separating some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship
from some larger context within which the audience presently
views that attribute" (Ware & Linkugel, 1973, p. 278).
The speaker attempts to divide the original situation into a
new construct, or constructs, of reality which is then
accompanied by a change in the audience's meaning of the
situation.

The charge is made less abstract.

Gold (1978)

claims, "In political campaigns, the candidate may try not
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only to redefine the larger context for the audience, but to
separate himself symbolically from the accusation by
attacking the source" (p. 308).

The presence of

differentiation as an important factor in apologia is often
signaled by the accused's request for a postponement of
judgement until the actions can be viewed from a different
momentary perspective (Ware & Linkugel, 1973).
The fourth and final major factor in Ware and
Linkugel's (1973) apologia of self-defense is transcendence.
This factor takes in "any strategy which cognitively joins
some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship with some
larger context within which the audience does not presently
view that attribute" (Ware & Linkugel, 1973, p. 280).

Those

strategies which involve a change in cognitive
identification and in meaning combine to form transcendence.
Transcendental strategies, therefore, emotionally divert the
audience's attention away from the particulars of the charge
at hand in a direction toward some more abstract, general
view of the speaker's character.
Ware and Linkugel (1973) also argue that speakers
usually assume one of four rhetorical postures, or
attitudes, when speaking in defense of their characters-absolution, vindication, explanation, or justification.
These postures are what Ware and Linkugel define as
subgenres of apologia:
The types of discourses within the genre • • •
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the combination of factors found in speeches of
self-defense. (1973, p. 274)
Ware and Linkugel believe that each apology is unique:
People speak in defense of themselves against
diverse charges, in varied situations, and through
the use of many different strategies. (1973,
p. 274)
An absolutive discourse, resulting from combining
primarily the differentiation and denial factors, is one in
which the speaker seeks acquittal.

The absolutive discourse

denies any wrong-doing and differentiates any personal
characteristics viewed by the audience as inappropriate
(Ware & Linkugel, 1973).

The vindicative discourse relies

heavily upon transcendental strategies and denial.

Such an

apology aims not only at preserving the accused's
reputation, but also in the recognition that the accused has
a greater worth as a human being in relation to those
accusing (Ware & Linkugel, 1973).

In the explanative

discourse the speaker assumes that if the audience
understands his or her motives they will be unable to
criticize.

The speaker chooses a somewhat defensive method,

combining the strategies of bolstering and differentiation
(Ware & Linkugel, 1973).

The justificative discourse

appeals not only for understanding, but also for approval.
Rhetorical postures used in this attitude of self-defense
rely upon the factors of bolstering and transcendence
strategies (Ware & Linkugel, 1973).
Reagan's speech of self-defense (see Appendix A)
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combines several of the factors in apologia characterized by
Ware and Linkugel.

In order to maintain an organized

arrangement, I will begin by providing examples of Reagan's
speech that can be applied to the factor of denial, followed
by examples applicable to the remaining three factors-bolstering, differentiation, transcendence--which
characterize speeches of self-defense.
Factors of Denial
According to Ware and Linkugel (1973), the factor of
denial consists of denying the facts of, or any relationship
to, the situation.

Denial may also involve the "denial of

intentions"--the accused does not deny that an action took
place, but does deny that there was harmful intent.

In the

denial stage, a speaker may also appear as an "innocent
bystander" in the situation.
In his discourse, Reagan employed strategies
appropriate to the factor of denial.

When the Iran-Contra

Affair first gained public attention, Reagan's first
response was to deny the facts.

In his first televised

address to the nation Reagan claimed, "Those charges are
utterly false. . . . We did not--repeat--did not trade
weapons or anything else for hostages--nor will we" (Reagan,
1986, p. AS).
the

u.s.

However, when the Tower report confirmed that

did trade arms for hostages, Reagan was compelled

to take a different approach.

Thus, Reagan employed other

methods of the denial factor.

First, Reagan accepts
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responsibility, but not blame; he then takes the role of the
innocent bystander by telling his audience that activities
were performed without his knowledge:
First, let me say I take full responsibility
[italics added] for my own actions and for those
of my Administration. As angry as I may be about
activities undertaken without my knowledge, I am
still accountable for those activities [italics
added]. As disappointed as I may be in some who
served me, I am still the one who must answer to
the American people for this behavior. And as
personally distasteful as I find secret bank
accounts and diverted funds, well, as the Navy
would say, this happened on my watch • . • •
As I told the Tower board, I didn't know
about any diversion of funds [italics added] to
the contras. But as President, I cannot escape
responsibility.
(Reagan, 1987, p. 323)
Reagan also relied upon what Ware and Linkugel define
as the denial of intentions.

The American public accepted

as fact that arms were traded for hostages--there could be
no denial.

Therefore, Reagan was compelled to communicate

that his intentions were honorable.

Reagan no longer denied

that there was an arms-for-hostages exchange; he told the
American public that his intentions were to develop better
relations with Iran, and that his greatest concern was in
the welfare of the hostages:
A few months ago I told the American people I did
not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best
intentions still tell me that is true [italics
added], but the facts and the evidence tell me it
is not. • • .
I undertook the original Iran initiative in
order to develop relations with those who might
assume leadership in a post-Khomeini Government.
• • • I let my personal concern for the hostages
spill over in to geopolitical strategy of reaching
out to Iran. I asked so many questions about the
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hostages' welfare that I didn't ask enough about
the specifics of the total plan.
(Reagan, 1987,
p. 323)
Factors of Bolstering
Reagan did not stop with strategies of denial.

He

moved from the denial stage into strategies of bolstering.
Reagan reminds the audience of his attributes that the
public had previously viewed as favorable:
I'm often accused of being an optimist [italics
added] . • . .
Much has been said about my management style, a
style that's worked successfully for me [italics
added] during my eight years as governor of
California and for most of my presidency. The way
I work is to identify the problem, find the right
individuals to do the job and then let them go do
it. I've found this invariably brings out the
best in people. They seem to rise to their full
capability, and in the long run you get more done
[italics added].
(Reagan, 1987, p. 323)
Reagan then moves toward trying to improve the situation by
change--he tells his audience that he is taking steps to
remove the abuse that took place:
I've already begun correcting this. As a start,
yesterday I met with the entire professional staff
of the National Security Council. I defined for
them the values I want to guide the national
security policies of this country. I told them
that I wanted a policy that was as justifiable and
understandable in public as it was in secret. .
And I told them that there'll be no more
·freelancing by individuals when it comes to our
national security . • • •
I'm going beyond its [Tower board]
recommendations, so as to put the house in even
better order.
(Reagan, 1987, p. 323)
In bolstering, Reagan had to identify with something that
was viewed favorably by the audience.

The American people
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wanted the blunder corrected.
just that.

Most of Reagan's speech did

He told his audience that he was taking steps

for more accountability in the areas of personnel, national
security policy, and the process for making decisions
(Reagan, 1987).

He gave an in depth report of all changes

that would take place, and the changes that had already
taken place:
I'm taking action • . . •
I've brought in an accomplished and highly
respected new team. • • •
. . . my new chief of staff • . . .
• • • my new national security adviser • •
Already, almost half the N.s.c. professional staff
is comprised of new people. . • •
Yesterday I nominated • • . .
• • I have ordered • • •
I have also directed • • • .
I have had issued . .
I have asked . • • •
• • . I am adopting . • • •
I've created . . . .
I am also determined. • • • Proper procedures
• • • will be followed, not only in letter but in
spirit. (Reagan, 1987, p. 323)
Reagan relied primarily on the factor of bolstering.
His purpose seemed to be one that he used quite frequently
in other discourses--identifying his views and values with
that of the American public's (White, 1988).

Realizing the

effects the scandal had caused regarding his own
credibility, Reagan used the strategy of bolstering when he
told his audience that changes would be made so that a
crisis like this would not happen again.
Factors of Differentiation
Strategies within the factor of differentiation are
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used in order to separate the situation or crisis from the
larger context within which the audience presently views it,
or to change the audience's understanding of the situation
by urging the audience to postpone judgement so that the
situation can be viewed differently (Ware & Linkugel, 1973).
The information that the audience received about the IranContra Affair was so damaging that trying to change the
American public's understanding of the situation would not
have been realistic.

However, Reagan did attempt to

separate himself from the Iran-Contra Affair and implies
that the audience should defer judgement until they have all
of the facts:
The reason I haven't spoken to you before now is
this: You deserved the truth. And, as frustrating
as the waiting has been, I felt it was improper to
come to you with sketchy reports, or possibly even
erroneous statements, which would then have to be
corrected, creating even more doubt and confusion.
There's been enough of that.
I've paid a price for my silence in terms of
your trust and confidence. But I have had to
wait, as have you [italics added], for the
complete story.
(Reagan, 1987, p. 322)
Reagan separates himself from the situation by attacking
those involved, "This runs counter to my own beliefs
[italics added], to Administration policy and to the
original strategy we had in mind" (Reagan, 1987, p. 323).
Factors of Transcendence
The final factor in Ware and Linkugel's taxonomy is
transcendence.

Those strategies which involve a

modification in cognitive identification and in meaning
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combine to form transcendence (Ware & Linkugel, 1973).
Transcendental strategies emotionally shift the audience
away from a specific accusation toward a more ideal view of
the speaker's character.

Reagan diverted the audience away

from the specific crisis of selling arms to a foreign enemy
by ignoring questions raised by the Tower review board; he
did not address the report that NSC advisors secretly
managed aid to Contra rebels.

He even ignored the board's

disclosure of his top aides covering up the affair. What
Reagan did was shift the audience's attention toward the
Tower Report's recommendations.

He reminded his audience

that it was he who requested a thorough investigation into
the Iran-Contra Affair; and it was he who reminded the
audience of his absolution, by the Tower Commission, of any
guilt.
Reagan goes beyond the reasons for the investigation
and directs the audience's attention toward other issues.
He transcends the problem of the N.S.c.•s trustworthiness
and explains how dedicated the N.S.C. is:
You've heard a
tell you, they
employees, who
benefit. They
their country.

lot about the staff . . • . I can
are good and dedicated Government
put in long hours for the nation's
are eager and anxious to serve
(Reagan, 1987, p. 323)

Reagan shifts attention from the Tower Report's
findings, to personally addressing the hostage families:
Let me say to the hostage families, we have not
given up. We never will, and I promise you we'll
use every legitimate means to free your loved ones
from captivity. But I must caution that those
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Americans who freely remain in such dangerous
areas must know that they're responsible for their
own safety.
(Reagan, 1987, p. 323)
Finally, Reagan becomes the main character in his own
narrative.

He attempts to create an identification with his

audience in order for them to experience the trauma of
overcoming a crisis situation.

He talks about what happens

when people make mistakes:
You take your knocks, you learn your lessons and
then you move on [italics added]. That's the
healthiest way to deal with a problem. • • • The
business of our country must proceed [italics
added] . • • • I've heard this message from you,
the American people.
You know, by the time you reach my age, you've
made plenty of mistakes if you've lived your life
properly. So you learn. You put things in
perspective. You pull your energies together.
You change. You go forward [italics added].
My fellow Americans, I have a great deal that I
want to accomplish [italics added] with you and
for you over the next two years, and, the Lord
willing, that's exactly what I intend to do
[italics added].
(Reagan, 1987, p. 324)
Ronald Reagan transcended the original emphasis of his
discourse, that of denying guilt, and told a story about how
good people make mistakes, that mistakes are a part of
life --if you learn from your mistakes.

Reagan attempted to

divert his audience away from the accusations of guilt to
starting over and leaving the past.
Postures of Apologia
Ware and Linkugel (1973) believe that in speeches of
self-defense a speaker usually assumes a certain posture, or
attitude, when delivering a discourse.

The postures Ware
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and Linkugel have identified are 1) absolution; 2)
vindication; 3) explanation; and 4) justification.

In

analyzing Reagan's apologetic discourse I found that he
assumed more than just one posture.
Reagan combined the factors of denial, bolstering,
differentiation, and transcendence throughout his speech.
Although Ware and Linkugel assert that a speaker usually
assumes one of four rhetorical postures when defending his
or her character, I have determined that Reagan, from time
to time, assumed all four postures.

Reagan attempted to

absolve himself from the crisis by denying any wrong-doing
and by requesting his audience to postpone judgement until
all facts had been revealed.
A goal of Reagan's speech was to sustain his
reputation.

One of the reasons he chose to address the

American public was to regain the credibility that he had
lost.

Through vindication Reagan asked the audience to view

him as having a greater worth than the image that was
focused on him due to the Iran-Contra crisis.
In assuming a justificative posture, speakers appeal to
audiences for understanding and approval.

Reagan relied

upon the factors of bolstering and transcendence--he sought
the audience's understanding and their approval.
The major strategy Reagan used in his speech was
bolstering.

Bolstering and differentiation is classified by

Ware and Linkugel (1973) under the posture of explanation.
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Reagan's primary purpose in speaking was one of explanation.
Although Reagan found the need to absolve himself from
accusations of guilt, there was a greater need to explain
why the crisis took place, and, that changes would take
place so that situations like this would not happen in the
future.
SUMMARY

President Reagan's response to the Tower Commission's
report can be identified as apologia--a speech of selfdefense.

His speech illustrates those factors that Ware and

Linkugel allege are necessary when defending a person's
credibility.

Understanding those factors used in apologia

are beneficial to the rhetorical critic when examining
speeches used in self-defense.
Ronald Reagan's involvement in the Iran-Contra crisis
compelled him to respond to the public and explain the
situation.

His discourse required the use of specific

strategies necessary to rebuild a person's credibility.
Reagan applied the communication skills he had used so
successfully in the past. President Reagan had to combat the
image that had been forced upon him due to the Tower Report.
The ability to recover had rested squarely on his shoulders
(Boyd, 1987; "The Tower," 1987).

In the following chapter I

will draw upon the media's assessment of Reagan's discourse
to ascertain whether Reagan recovered his lost credibility.

CHAPTER VI
MEDIA ASSESSMENTS OF REAGAN'S RESPONSE
On the evening of March 4, 1987, as Ronald Reagan stood
before the nation to deliver his discourse, the media and
the American public awaited his words.

The media loved

crucifixions, but the American public loved repentance and
resurrections (Boyd, 1987).
While there is no doubt that the Iran-Contra Affair
diminished the public's faith in Reagan's credibility,
evaluations by the media of Reagan's March 4 discourse
indicated approval of the rhetorical strategies used.

The

day after President Reagan delivered his discourse, The
Washington Post reported:
Leaders of both parties said last night they think
that President Reagan has turned the corner toward
political recovery [italics added] by
acknowledging responsibility for failings of his
Iran policy and taking credible steps to improve
his White House staff and national-security
operation.
(Broder & Walsh, 1987, p. A1)
Writers and commentators for The Washington Post continued
their evaluations of Reagan's discourse:
Last night's televised address by Ronald Reagan
was one of the most crucial of his presidency, a
screen test in the literal sense, and a first
impression is that he passed it [italics added].
(Shales, 1987, p. B1)
The media believed Reagan was reauditioning for the role of
"The Gipper," and that he had played his part well: "he was
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masterful and his buoyancy reassuring [italics added]"

(Shales, 1987, p. Bl).

Shales final assessment of Reagan's

speech was that The Gipper was back:
If you could have taken a voice vote of viewers at
the moment the speech ended, it's likely they
would have chosen precisely what their pal the
president wanted. It sounded so right and
reasonable they way he said it [italics added].
(1987, p. B4)
Commentator Richard Cohen assessed Reagan's speech as
"making a comeback."

Although Cohen stated, "A speech is

just a speech," he also admitted, "But this was a good, not
to mention clever, one" (1987, p. A23).

He believed that

Reagan had met the test others had set for him:
The easiest thing in public life is to accept
responsibility. The hardest is to accept blame.
There is a world of difference between them, and
in his televised speech to the nation, President
Reagan closed the gap that he had opened between
the two. He accepted both. (Cohen, 1987, p. A23)
Cohen also scored Reagan above others who had attempted to
redeem their credibility, but had failed:
As always, Reagan set his own grading curve.
Where others would be faulted, he is pardoned
[italics added]. Where others would be held
accountable, he is not. He advances into
every political battle shielded by his own
shimmering persona--his humanity, his total
oneness with the American people. That was on
display Wednesday night. He remains what he
always was: a winning and engaging man [italics
added].
(1987, p. A23)
Los Angeles Times columnist David Broder questioned why
Reagan had taken so long to tell the public of the mistakes
that were made: "Historians of the Reagan presidency will
face the challenge of explaining why he delayed so long in
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saying and doing things that were so clearly necessary and
so evidently in the nation's interest" (1987, p. B5).

Even

so, Broder appraised Reagan's speech as "a new beginning."
Journalists continued to write of the magic Reagan was
able to invoke in his speech:
Ronald Reagan is back [italics added]. Only a few
weeks ago it looked to many as though the last two
years of the Reagan presidency would be
unsalvageable. • • • But the diatribe against this
President is softening as he performs his magic of
reconciliation [italics added] with Congress and
the American public. • . .
So far, President Reagan is making maximum
benefit of a recovery that many said could never
happen [italics added].
(Nickles, 1987, p. B5)

Although Democrats tried their best to diffuse Reagan's
performance, Republicans, eager to put the affair behind
them, described Reagan's speech as "a turning point":
President Reagan's speech tonight was a turning
point in the crisis [italics added] • • • •
"The Gipper's back [italics added]," said
Senator Dan Quayle, Republican of Indiana. "He's
learned his lesson and he's ready to move
forward." John G. Tower, a Republican who headed
the Presidential board that investigated the
affair, called the President's performance
"brilliant [italics added]." (Dionne, 1987b,
p. Al8)

In addition, a New York Times news analysis compared
Reagan's response to the Iran-Contra crisis to that of John
F. Kennedy and his response to the Bay of Pigs fiasco:
President Reagan spoke to the American people
tonight in a spirit of contrition that has not
been heard from the White House in a quarter
century • • • • Not since John F. Kennedy took the
blame for the catastrophic Bay of Pigs invasion in
1961 has any President so openly confessed error.
President Kennedy [like Reagan] did not
explicitly apologize after the Bay of Pigs
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invasion, nor did he describe his polices as a
failure. He said the United States would "profit
from this lesson," remarked that "victory has a
hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan," and
pointedly, "I'm the responsible officer of the
Government."
In very much the same spirit, Mr. Reagan
declared tonight, "This happened on my watch."
(Apple, 1987b, pp. Al,A18; see also Borger &
Walsh, 1987)
Clearly, the consensus of the media was that President
Reagan gave the right speech to reestablish his credibility.
He did not apologize, yet he assumed responsibility.

Reagan

admitted mistakes and pledged to redeem the damage in his
final two years in office.

There was no crucifixion, as

some had speculated (Boyd, 1987), just repentance and
resurrection.

Less than one week later Reagan's credibility

slowly began to ascend ("Opinion," 1988; Citrin, Green, &
Reingold, 1987).

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Historical documents provide evidence that the IranContra Affair significantly diminished President Reagan's
high credibility standing with the American public.

Reagan

responded to the rhetorical situation, defended his
credibility through a speech of self-defense, and regained
the confidence of the American people.

Following his

speech, Reagan's credibility rating slowly increased.
Although other factors may have contributed to the increase,
news polls clearly confirmed an immediate increase in
Reagan's approval rating after he delivered his discourse
("Opinion," 1988).
Reagan survived.

He was able to defuse the situation

and rebuild his credibility.

His popularity and apparent

sincerity had a positive effect on his success because
people tend to believe and accept facts from someone they
like or trust (Cosec, 1987).

The American people forgave

him.
In the past, Reagan engendered trust from the American
people.

After his discourse, Reagan continued to draw from

"the well."

When President Reagan left office in January

1989, 68% of the American people approved of his overall job
performance, 71% approved of his handling of foreign
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relations, and 62% approved of his handling of the economy
(Roberts, 1989).
In assessing Reagan's discourse as a speech of selfdefense in response to a rhetorical situation, I have
established that the events of the Iran-Contra Affair
qualify as a crisis, and thus exemplify an exigence needing
a response.

I have demonstrated this through the elements

of Bitzer's rhetorical situation by applying Reagan's
response to the genre of apologia and the strategies useful
in defending oneself.
An examination of Ronald Reagan's response, analyzed
through the rhetorical genre of apologia, reveals the
following: 1) The Iran-Contra Affair is an appropriate
example and study for a rhetorical situation; 2) Ronald
Reagan made full use of the conventional apologetic
strategies of denial, bolstering, differentiation, and
transcendence outlined by Ware and Linkugel; and 3) the
utility of understanding apologia as a set of strategies for
rebuilding credibility should be viewed as a salient
constant.
This study confirms the utility of a particular genre-that of apologia.

It also suggests that there is a special

relationship between the presidency and the populace.
Presidential figures have, in the past, been placed before
the public in regard to defending themselves: Lyndon Johnson
defended his plans for expanding the Vietnam war; Richard
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Nixon defended his involvement in the Watergate break-in;
Jimmy Carter defended his intention to carry out the Desert
One hostage rescue mission ("The Culture," 1987).

In each

situation the issue became the defense of one's character,
not policy.

Where these men failed, Reagan was successful.

The media liked what he said and what he said pertained to
the particular strategies of denial, bolstering,
differentiation, and transcendence.
The persistent probing of the media into a person's
moral character makes apologetic responses more difficult
today.

As Gold states:

The power of contemporary mass media to transmit
and repeat such charges all over the country means
that even frivolous accusations have great
damaging potential. (1978, p. 308)
Presidential candidates are finding that their moral
character is more newsworthy than their issues, policies and
voting records.

Reagan was successful, in spite of

contemporary media.
One could conclude, and further study may suggest, that
part of the relationship between the presidency and the
populace may be in the form of symbolic performance-degradation rituals.

There are times when a president must

humble himself before the people before he can be elevated.
It is entirely possible to argue that the rhetorical
techniques and strategies available to politicians in
defending themselves from attacks on their character can be
generalized as a form of political apologia.

A presidential
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candidate's ability to cope with the accusations against his
credibility and his response may be the determining factor
of the election.

Aspiring presidents may win or lose

depending on their ability to practice the ritual of selfdefense (Gold, 1978).

Thus, when those in the public eye

are faced with similar situations, they would be wise to
follow the strategies employed by Reagan using the
rhetorical genre of apologia in order to be successful.
Ronald Reagan's discourse is a valuable model in the
study of apologia as a particular kind of communicative
response.

Rhetoric is shaped by prior rhetoric, by verbal

conventions in a culture, and by past ideas and issues.

By

further developing theory of the rhetorical process, we can
generate concepts on how we and others can more effectively
communicate, understand, and perhaps even influence
political discourse in the future.
Ronald Reagan, whether we admired him or not, proved
himself to be "the great communicator" because he told his
story the way the American people wanted to hear it; and he
told it in a most persuasive way.
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Appendix A
Chronology of the Iran-contra Affair

Following is a chronology of major events in the IranContra Affair, based on reports from the House and Senate
Select Committees formed to investigate the Iran-Contra
Affair, and the Tower Commission, whose role was to
investigate the National

11/14/79

u.s.

Securi~y

Council staff:

imposes embargo on arms shipments to

Iran.

9/19/83

10/23/83
12/83

President signs finding authorizing covert
aid intended to pressure the Sandinistas to
negotiate a treaty with nearby countries.
Bombing of u.s. Marine barracks in Beirut,
killing 241 Marines.
$24-million cap on Contra funding imposed by
Congress.

12/14/83

u.s.

1/20/84

u.s.

begins "Operation Staunch," urging
allied governments to "stop transferring arms
to Iran."
government officially lists Iran as a
sponsor of international terrorism.

4/7/84

Disclosure of mining of Nicaraguan harbors.
Public criticism of u.s. involvement
undermines congressional support for
assistance to the Contras.

5/84

McFarlane meets with Ambassador of "Country
Two," who agrees to provide $1 million per
month as contribution to the Contras.

Spring

1

84

According to North, he and Casey first
discuss the "fall-guy plan," to provide
"plausible deniability" to North's superiors.
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6/25/84

Summer

National Security Planning Group (NSPG)
meeting to consider options for funding
Contra (President, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger,
casey, Meese, McFarlane present). Casey
urges President to seek third-country
funding. Shultz quotes Jim Baker that
such would be an impeachable offense. Meese
recalls William French Smith opinion
providing authority for such. No decision
made. Neither President nor McFarlane
reveals County Two contribution already
agreed to.

84

At Casey's suggestion, according to North,
North recruited retired Air Force Major
General Richard Secord, operator of the
"Enterprise," to assist in buying weapons for
the Contras with the third-country funds
being received.

8/31/84

National Security advisor Robert McFarlane
formally requests government agencies to
reassess and analyze u.s. policy toward Iran.

9/2/84

National Security staff member Lt. Col.
Oliver North suggests to McFarlane that a
private donor be found to give a helicopter
to the Nicaraguan Contra rebels. It is an
early indication of the NSC's interest in
soliciting private aid for the Contras. u.s.
military assistance to the Contras was barred
by the so-called Boland Amendment enacted in
1982.

1

10/12/84

Spring

Boland II becomes law.

2/85

Country Two agrees to contribute additional
$24 million. President informed by head of
state.

85

First two arms shipments arranged by Secord
and North reach Contras.

1

4/18/85

Lt. Col. North, according to the commission,
sketches a diagram proposing how money from
private donors might be channeled to the
contras under a program he dubs "Project
Democracy."
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4/23/85

House rejects administration's Contra-aid
request.

5/1/85

President announces imposition of economic
sanctions against Nicaragua.

5/3/85

Michael Ledeen, an NSC consultant, (with
McFarlane's approval) meets with Israeli
Prime Minister Shimon Peres and expresses
interest in sharing intelligence on Iran.
Peres asks Ledeen if the u.s. would approve a
shipment of arms to Iran. Ledeen agrees on
behalf of McFarlane. Hostages discussed,
according to Israelis.

6/19/85

Ghorbanifar, Iranian arms dealer and
businessman, and Furmark, New York
businessman, meet Israelis in Israel to
propose sale of 100 TOWs to Iran.
Ghorbanifar agrees to set up meeting with
Iranian official.

7/3/85

David Kimchee, Director General of the
Israeli Foreign Ministry, tells McFarlane
that Iran wants to open a "political
discourse" with the u.s.

7/8/85

President's speech to American Bar
Association. Calls Iran part of
"confederation of terrorist states • • • a
new international version of Murder Inc.
America will never make concessions to
terrorists." Refers to Iran, Libya, North
Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua as "outlaw states
run by the strangest collection of misfits,
Looney Tunes and squalid criminals since the
advent of the Third Reich."

7/8/85

Israelis meet in Hamburg with Ghorbanifar,
Khashoggi, Saudi Arabian businessman, and
Iranian representative to discuss sale of 100
TOWs, with sale to be followed by release of
the American hostages.

7/8/85

John Singlaub's (retired u.s. Army Major
General) arms shipment received by Contras.
Last arms shipment by dealer other than
Secord, and last time funds were handled by
Adolfo Calero, political director of the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force, rather than by
the "Enterprise."
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7/18/85

Late July

President Reagan, recuperating in a hospital
from cancer surgery, authorizes McFarlane to
make contact with Iran through the Israelis.
McFarlane later says the President was "all
for letting the Israelis do anything they
wanted" in dealing with Iran.

85

Ledeen meets in Israel with Iranian-born arms
dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar, who says Iran
might arrange to release u.s. hostages if the
u.s. helps Iran obtain weapons.

8/2/85

Kimchee meets with McFarlane in Washington to
seek explicit u.s. position on sale of 100
TOWs. McFarlane agrees to present issue to
the President.

8/6/85

Meeting with the President, McFarlane, Bush,
Shultz, Weinberger, and Regan. Permission
for the sale of 100 TOWs to Iran by Israel is
discussed. Shultz and Weinberger opposed.
McFarlane testified that the President called
him several days later and authorized the
Israelis to proceed.
(The President told the
Tower Board that he had authorized the sale,
then said that he had not authorized the
sale, and finally said that he had no
recollection one way or the other.)

8/8/85

President signs bill authorizing $27 million
in humanitarian assistance to the Contras.

8/10/85

North meets with Castillo, pseudonym for the
CIA station chief in Costa Rica, and Tambs,
Ambassador to Costa Rica, in Costa Rica to
discuss establishment of secret air base for
resupply of Contras in Nicaragua.

8/20/85

96 TOWs delivered by Israel to Iran. It is
the first of at least eight separate arms
shipments over the next 14 months. No
hostages are released.

1

Fall '85

North meets with representative of Country
Three at Hay-Adams Hotel to request funds for
Contras. Country Three eventually donates $2
million.

9/4-5/85

Ledeen meets in Paris with Israelis and
Ghorbanifar. Ghorbanifar indicates that one
hostage will be released in exchange for an
additional 400 TOW missiles.
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9/15/85

Israel delivers 408 missiles to Iran.
McFarlane is given the choice of the release
of any hostage other than Buckley. That same
day Rev. Benjamin Weir becomes the first u.s.
hostage to be released by pro-Iranian Shiite
militiamen in Lebanon. Two more hostages are
released over the next year.

10/10/85

White House spokesman Speakes reading
statement following capture of hijackers of
the Achille Lauro: "From the outset the
United States Government made • . . clear to
all the governments involved our firm
opposition with negotiations with terrorists
or concessions to them."

11/15/85

McFarlane meets with Israeli Defense Minister
Rabin at White House and conveys President's
authorization for further arms sale, with
u.s. replenishment of Israeli stocks.

11/17/85

McFarlane informs President about shipment of
80 HAWKs just before they leave for summit
meeting in Geneva.

11/18/85

Problem develops with flight clearances for
shipment of HAWKs to Iran, and North recruits
Secord to go to Europe to resolve it.

11/22/85

The Central Intelligence Agency arranges for
the shipment of HAWK antiaircraft missiles
from Israel to Iran.

11/24-25/85

First 19 HAWK missiles delivered by CIA plane
from Israel to Teheran. Remaining HAWKs
rejected by Iran as obsolete. No hostages
released.

11/25/85

John McMahon, CIA Deputy Director, declares
that the CIA will not provide any more covert
assistance unless President Reagan explicitly
authorizes such operations.

11/30/85

McFarlane resigns as National Security
Adviser.

12/4 85

Vice Admiral John Poindexter succeeds
McFarlane as National Security Adviser.
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12/5/85

In one of his first acts as National Security
Adviser, Poindexter presents finding to
President, who signs it. Regan, present at
the briefing, has no memory of President's
signing it.) Finding retroactively
authorizes HAWK shipment and indicates
exchange for hostages.

12/6/85

North tells Israeli officials at meeting in
New York that u.s. wants to use profits from
upcoming arms sale to Iran to fund activity
in Nicaragua (according to Israeli Historical
Chronology submitted to the Committee).

12/7/85

President Reagan holds a meeting in his
office with Bush, Casey, Shultz, Weinberger,
McFarlane, Poindexter, John McMahon, and
Regan. Strong opposition to arms sale
expressed by Shultz and Weinberger.
President Reagan later says he recalls
discussing a complex Iranian proposal for
release of hostages keyed to arms shipments
in installments from the Israelis.

12/8/85

McFarlane meets in London with Kimche,
Secord, North, Nimrodi, former Israeli
defense official and arms dealer, and
Ghorbanifar. McFarlane is unhappy with
Ghorbanifar•s arms-for-hostage approach.
North id unhappy with McFarlane's negative
reaction, raises specter of hostage deaths if
plan doesn't go forward.

12/9/85

North submits to Poindexter a memo proposing
a direct arms-for-hostages exchange, to be
handled by Secord, a North associate who is
also believed to have been running a private
supply network for the Contras, and
Ghorbanifar. North, Ghorbanifar, Ledeen,
Secord, new Israeli antiterrorist advisor
Amiram Nir--who had taken Kimchee•s place-jointly work out an arms-for-hostages plan
over the next few weeks. It is not known who
took the lead.

12/12/85

Poindexter visits Central America.

12/13/85

on return from Central America, Poindexter
briefs President on secret airstrip in Costa
Rica.
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1/2/86

Nir meets with Poindexter and North in
Washington to propose new arms sale involving
4,000 TOWs, the release of all American
hostages and 20-30 Hizballah prisoners held
by the Southern Lebanon Army.

1/3/86

North and Sporkin, CIA General Counsel, meet
to draft new finding to authorize CIA
participation in new arms sales (and
inclusion of "third parties" in draft North
prepared).

1/6/86

President Reagan signs a "finding," or order,
authorizing covert action including arms
shipments to Iran to help secure the release
of American hostages. Reagan late tells the
Commission he does not recall signing the
finding; Chief of Staff Regan tells the
Commission the order "may have been signed in
error."

1/7/86

At National Security Council meeting, with
President, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Meese,
Casey, Poindexter, and Regan present,
Weinberger and Shultz object strenuously.
President's signing of the finding the
previous day is not mentioned.

1/15/86

North gives National Security Agency-provided KL-43 encryption devices to key
members of the Contra resupply operation.
This equipment and accompanying classified
codes allowed secure communications among
North, Secord, and others over open telephone
lines.

1/17/86

Reagan signs a second finding authorizing
arms shipments, with language only slightly
revised from that of the first (insertion of
the words "third parties," thereby allowing
for the use of the "Enterprise").

1/22/86

North, Secord, and Nir meet with Ghorbanifar
in London. Ghorbanifar, according to North
testimony, suggests diversion in bathroom
meeting. At London meeting, delivery
schedule for 1,000 TOW missiles agreed upon.
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Early Feb.'86

By this time, according to the Commission,
the CIA had begun acquiring weapons for Iran
and had designated a Swiss bank account for
the proceeds of the sales. The agency had
also put two airplanes "at the disposal of
General Secord."

2/17/86

First 500 TOWs shipped, returning with 17
rejected HAWKs from November 1985 shipment.

2/25/86

North, Secord, and Ghorbanifar meet with
Iranian official in Frankfurt. Albert Hakim
(Secord's business partner in the
"Enterprise"), under disguise, serves as
translator. Eventually agreement reached
that sale of 1,000 missiles will lead to
release of "a couple of hostages."

2/27/86

Second load of 500 TOWs delivered to Iran.
No hostages released.

3/7/86

North, George Cave (retired CIA officer),
Ghorbanifar, and Nir meet in"Paris.
Ghorbanifar indicates that Iranians are not
interested in additional TOWs, but seek 240
HAWK spare parts.

4/1/86

First air resupply to the Nicaraguan
Democratic Force (FDN) accomplished.

4/4/86

North writes memorandum for Poindexter to
present to President Reagan saying $12
million from the Iranian arms sales "will be
used to purchase critically needed supplies"
for the Nicaraguan Contra. However, the
Commission says it has no evidence that
Reagan saw the memo.

4/11/86

First successful air resupply mission into
southern Nicaragua accomplished.

4/20/86

North and Secord meet at the air base in
Central America with James J. Steele, Felix
Rodriguez (alias "Max Gomez," former CIA
operative recruited by North for resupply
operation in Central America), and the
military leadership of the FDN. Complaints
about the age and reliability of the
aircraft expressed.
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5/1/86

Rodriguez meets with Bush. Scheduling memo
states: "To brief the Vice President on the
status of the war in [a Central American
country) and resupply of the contras."

5/6/86

North, Nir, cave, and Ghorbanifar meet in
London to discuss pricing of spare-parts
shipment. Agreement that HAWK parts would be
brought on a plane with McFarlane for meeting
with high Iranian officials in Teheran.
Remainder of HAWK parts would be delivered
after release of hostages took place.

5/15/86

President Reagan approves a mission to
Teheran by McFarlane. The same day,
Poindexter tells North to "generate a cover
story" to conceal his heavy involvement with
unauthorized Contra supply operations. The
next day North sends a note to Poindexter
saying the clandestine arms shipments
"could well become a political embarrassment
for the President." North has "no idea" what
Chief of Staff Regan "does or does not know,"
North writes, but the President "obviously
knows why he has been meeting with several
select people to thank them" for providing
donations to the Contras.

5/16/86

National Security Planning Group {NSPG)
meeting with the President to discuss thirdcountry humanitarian assistance. Shultz
instructed to prepare list of potential
third-county donors. No one mentions Country
Two and Country Three funds already received
by the Contras.

5/25/86

McFarlane, North and other u.s. officials
travel to Teheran to meet with Iranian
officials. Poindexter has rejected North's
request for a prior meeting with the
President and other cabinet officers because
of potential objections from Shultz and
Weinberger. The u.s. entourage shares the
plane with a shipment of missile parts for
Iran.

5/28/86

McFarlane breaks off Teheran negotiations and
party leaves Teheran without the release of
hostages, having delivered one pallet of HAWK
parts.
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6/6/86

President Reagan approves military planning
to rescue the hostages. North told
Poindexter in February that the NSC staff was
drawing up plans.

6/16/86

Shultz first learns of Country Two
solicitation from McFarlane.

6/25/86

House approves $100 million for Contras.

7/4/86

Israelis and Ghorbanifar fail in effort to
convince Iranians to arrange release of
hostage in time for Statue of Liberty
celebration.

7/26/86

Father Jenco is released, as arranged
by Ghorbanifar and Israelis.

7/29/86

North memo to Poindexter predicts hostage
will be killed if HAWK parts not delivered to
Iran.

7/30/86

Poindexter indicates President approved
shipment of HAWK parts.

8/8/86

240 HAWK missile parts shipped to Iran.

8/8/86

North, Ghorbanifar, and Nir meet in London to
discuss continued initiative. North agrees
to sequential deliveries of arms and
hostages, subject to ratification by
administration.

8/8/86

Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs, meets Brunei
representative in London and solicits $10
million. Funds never reach Contras: North or
Fawn Hall, secretary to North, transposes
account number given to Brunei by Abrams.

8/8/86

Rodriguez meets with Donald T. Gregg, Bush's
National Security Adviser and former CIA
official, and voices allegations about Secord
group overpricing, Edwin Wilson connections,
etc. Rodriguez makes clear to Gregg
(reflected in his notes) that North is
involved. Gregg testified that he never told
Bush this.

8/25/86

Secord and Hakim meet with the "Second
Channel" in Brussels.
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9/9/86

Another American, Frank Reed, Director of the
Lebanese International School, is taken
hostage in West Beirut.

9/9/86

North calls
Sanchez and
assistance"
used by the

Costa Rican President Oscar Arias
threatens to "withhold u.s.
if Arias shuts down an airstrip
Contras.

9/12/86

Joseph Cicippio, Chief Accountant at the
American University, is abducted in West
Beirut, raising the number of American
hostages in Lebanon to five.

9/12/86

Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin offers
"a significant quantity of captured Soviet
bloc arms" for use by the Contras.
Poindexter discusses the offer prior to a
meeting between Reagan and Israeli Prime
Minister Shimon Peres Sept. 15.

9/15/86

North arranges for a Danish ship to pick up
weapons in Israel and deliver them to the
Contras.

9/19-20/86

Meeting in Washington with Iranians from
Second Channel. Iranians tour White House
with North.

9/25/86

Costa Rican officials hold press conference
announcing discovery of secret airstrip in
Costa Rica.

10/5/86

A cargo plane carrying arms to the Contras is
shot down over Nicaragua and a crewman,
Eugene Hasenfus, is captured. The u.s.
denies any connection to the operation, but
North Oct. 12 tells McFarlane that "we
urgently need to find a high-powered lawyer
and benefactor" for Hasenfus.

10/6-8/86

10/7/86

Meetings with Second Channel in Frankfurt.
North leaves Hakim to negotiate with the
Iranians. Agreement reached on nine-point
so-called Hakim Accords.
Casey is informed by Roy Furmark, a business
associate of Khashoggi, one of the principal
financiers of the arms sales, that investors
in the arms sales and Ghorbanifar are upset
and threatening to go public.
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10/13/86

According to North, Casey tells him sometime
between October 13 and November 4, 1986:
" . . . this whole thing was coming
unravelled and that things ought to be
'cleaned up.'" North testified that in
response to this instruction he began
shredding documents.

10/28/86

500 TOWs delivered to Iran under the "ninepoint plan." This is apparently the last
arms shipment.

10/29/86

North, Hakim, Cave, and Secord meet with
Second Channel in Mainz, Germany, to discuss
release of one or two hostages and completion
of nine-point plan.

11/2/86

David Jacobsen is released.

11/3/86

Al-Shiraa, Lebanese newspaper, reports
had sold arms to Iran.

u.s.

11/86

According to North, shortly after disclosure
of the arms sales, he and Casey discuss
implementing the "fall-guy plan." According
to North, Casey tells him that he (North)
might not be "big enough" to be the "fall
guy" and indicates that "it's probably going
to go higher." Casey suggests: "Poindexter
might have to be a fall guy."

11/6/86

Reagan, in his first public statement on the
subject of the reports of u.s. arms sales
to Iran, states they have "no foundation."

11/13/86

In a television address to the nation,
President Reagan acknowledged that the u.s.
had sent "less than a planeload" of weapons
to Iran. He also stated, "We did not-repeat--not trade weapons or anything else
for hostages nor will we."

11/18-19/86

McFarlane and North prepare a chronology of
the arms sales for Reagan's reference that
obscures the President's approval of the
first shipment.

11/19/86

President denies third-country involvement in
arms sales, asserts u.s. involvement only
after January 17 finding, asserts that only
1,000 TOWs were shipped, and that everything
"sold could be put in one cargo plane."

97

11/20/86

Shultz meets with President to inform him of
misstatements at press conference and that he
was receiving misinformation from
subordinates. Shultz testified, "Not the
kind of discussion I ever thought I would
have with the President of the United
States."

11/20/86

Meeting held in Poindexter's office to review
Casey statement prepared for testimony before
the House and Senate Intelligence Committees
on November 21. Casey, Meese, Poindexter,
North, Cooper (Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel), Thompson (National
Security Council Counsel), and Gates (CIA
Deputy Director) attend. At North's
suggestion, statement is changed to say "no
one in the u.s. Government" knew at the time
that the November 1985 shipment contained
arms. The "oil drilling equipment" story
agreed to at the meeting was false, as North
admitted in his testimony. It was removed
from Casey's testimony at the insistence of
State Department Legal Adviser Abraham
Sofaer.

11/21/86

President authorizes Meese to commence an
inquiry into the arms-sales matter.

11/21/86

North instructs Fawn Hall to alter series of
documents. North, Earl (Deputy to North),
and Hall shred documents.

11/21/86

Poindexter tells North that the President was
never told of the diversion of Iran armssales funds to the Contras.

11/21/86

Casey and Poindexter appear before the
Intelligence Committees. Poindexter tells
the Committees that the u.s. had disapproved
of the Israeli arms shipments to Iran and
that until the day before (11/20) he had
believed that administration officials did
not know of them until after they had
occurred.

11/21/86

Poindexter destroys December 1985 retroactive
presidential finding.
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11/22/86

Diversion memo discovered by Reynolds
(Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division) and Richardson (Meese's Chief of
Staff). Meese is told at lunch at Old Ebbitt
Grill.

11/22/86

Casey and Poindexter have lunch for two and a
half hours. Poindexter testified that he
remembers nothing about what was discussed.

11/22/86

Meese meets with Casey at Casey's home (6:00
P.M.). According to Meese's later testimony,
he does not ask about diversion.

11/23/86

Meese interviews North. North conceals
existence of the "Enterprise"--Secord's
companies and Swiss bank accounts-- telling
Meese that funds went directly from Israelis
to Calero's accounts.

11/23/86

Later that evening North shreds additional
documents at his office, working until at
least 4:15 A.M.

11/25/86

Meese press conference revealing diversion of
funds from arms sales to Iran to Contras.

11/25/86

National Security Council security officer
secures North's office.

11/25/86

Fawn Hall smuggles documents out of North's
office.

11/25/86

Reagan accepts Poindexter's resignation and
fires North after it is revealed that profits
from the arms sales to Iran have been
diverted to the Contras.

11/26/86

President Reagan appoints the Tower
Commission to review the operation of the NSC
and recommend corrective action.

12/1/86

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
begins preliminary inquiry.

12/2/86

Frank Carlucci is named National Security
Adviser to replace Poindexter.

12/4/86

House and Senate leaders agree to form
separate Watergate-style select committees to
investigate the scandal, with work expected
to begin in January.
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12/6/86

Reagan in his weekly radio address
acknowledges for the first time that
"mistakes were made" in the plan to sell
weapons to Iran and funnel profits to the
Contras. He says the errors occurred only in
the execution of policy, not "in the
policies themselves."

12/8/86

Shultz testifies before House Foreign Affairs
Committee, distancing himself again from the
administration's actions concerning arms
sales to Iran and the channeling of funds to
the Contras. McFarlane testifies before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee that North
informed him in May that "the u.s. Government
had applied part of the proceeds" from the
sale of arms to Iran "to support the
Contras." His testimony contradicts
statements by Reagan and Meese that the u.s.
was not involved in any transfer of funds to
the rebels.

12/10/86

Casey testified before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee that on Oct. 7, 1986 he was
told by New York businessman Roy Furmark, a
former legal client, about "the whole
operation" involving arms to Iran and the
possibility that "some of the money may have
been diverted for other purposes." However,
Casey claimed he had no knowledge of the
diversion of funds to the Contras and
repeatedly professed ignorance about CIA cash
transactions involving Swiss bank accounts.
He said the first official information he
received cane from Meese on or shortly before
November 25.

12/10/86

Poindexter refuses to testify during a 10minute appearance before the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.

12/10/86

Swiss officials reported the u.s. failed to
provide documentation to back up its request
to freeze two bank accounts. As a result,
one account effectively remains open to
further transactions. Legal experts
expressed surprise at the u.s. delay, one
Swiss official hypothesizing that perhaps
"the Americans don't really want us to block
the accounts at all."
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12/13/86

Meeting with Second Channel in Frankfurt.
This is first meeting at which State
Department is represented. As a result
Shultz learns of the nine-point plan.

12/14/86

Shultz reports nine-point plan to the
President. Shultz testified that the
President was "stunned and furious."
Poindexter testified that the President had
approved the plan.

12/15/86

CIA Director Casey suffers arm and leg
seizures and is admitted to Georgetown
University Hospital where he is diagnosed as
having lymphoma, a rare form of brain cancer.
He is scheduled to testify before Congress
the next day.

12/15/86

Regan testifies in closed session before the
Senate Intelligence Committee. He said
neither he nor Reagan had any prior knowledge
of funds being diverted to the Contras, and
that the President authorized the Israeli
arms shipment after the fact.

12/15/86

Swiss officials said they had received an
expanded request from the u.s. government
requesting that all accounts associated with
North and two others be frozen. On the basis
of the request the Swiss government asked the
Credit Suisse bank to block the appropriate
accounts, and Credit suisse complied,
announcing that at least two accounts
had been frozen.

12/15/86

Eugene Hasenfus, who had begun serving a 30year sentence for transporting arms to
Nicaragua, was pardoned by Daniel Ortega and
released to visiting Senator Christopher
Dodd.

12/19/86

Lawrence E. Walsh is named Independent
Counsel with authority to investigate the
Iran arms sales, the diversion of funds to
"any foreign country, including, but limited
to Nicaragua," and "the Provision or
coordination of support for persons
or entities engaged as military insurgents in
armed conflict with the Government of
Nicaragua since 1984."
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12/26/86

David Abshire, outgoing NATO Ambassador, is
appointed by Reagan to "coordinate White
House activities in all aspects of the Iran
matter," effective January 5, 1.987.

1/6/87

Senate Select Committee created.

1/7/87

House Select Committee created.

1/24/87

The Army admits it undercharged the CIA $2.5
million for 2,008 TOW antitank missile parts
sent to Iran last year. Although the
discrepancy was "an honest mistake,"
according to report, the administration, as a
consequence, did not have to report the sale
to Congress because it fell below the $14
million cut-off for notification.

1/24/87

Three hostages kidnapped in Lebanon (Alann
Steen, Jesse Turner, and Robert Polhill).

1/26/87

Reagan meets for 76 minutes with members of
the Tower Commission. This is the first
discussion of the controversy the President
had held with any group other than his staff.

1/27/87

In his State of the Union address, Reagan
acknowledged that "serious mistakes were
made" in the program of selling arms to Iran,
but does not disavow the policy itself. He
also stood firmly behind the policy of aid to
the Contras.

1/29/87

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
issues report on preliminary inquiry.

2/2/87

Casey resigns as Director of Central
Intelligence Agency.

2/9/87

McFarlane takes an overdose of 20 to 30
Valium pills. Police officials, calling it a
suicide attempt, said he wrote a note
relating to the incident. Friends attribute
his action to failing to live up to his own
standards rather than fear of pending
investigations. McFarlane was to testify
before the Tower Commission the next day.
He said later he tried to kill himself
because he "failed the country."
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2/26/87

The President's Special Review Board, known
as the Tower Commission, released its report.
This special commission created by President
Reagan interviewed many of the participants

and gathered most of the significant
documents. The report, at the time the IranContra Committee began its investigation,
provided the basis for most of what was then
known about the affair.
2/27/87

3/4/87

Reagan meets with Howard Baker to discuss
Baker's taking over as White House Chief of
Staff. After the 20 minute session, Baker
accepts. Informed of the move, Regan
immediately has a one-sentence letter of
resignation typed out.
President's oval Office Speech on Iran.

4/29/87

Carl Channell, private fund-raise for the
Contras, pleads guilty to conspiracy and tax
fraud, naming North and Richard R. Miller as
co-conspirators.

5/5-8/87

House and Senate Committees investigating the
Iran-Contra arms scandal opened their joint
public hearings.

5/6/87

Miller pleads guilty to conspiracy and tax
fraud.

5/6/87

Former CIA Director Casey dies of pneumonia.
Because of his illness, which followed
surgery to excise a brain tumor in 1986,
Casey had not been expected to testify at the
hearings.

5/11-14/87

Former White House National Security Adviser
McFarlane testifies voluntarily. However, a
combination of incomplete or evasive answers
left specific details about Reagan's role
still unclear.

5/14-19/98

Robert Owen, messenger between Contra leaders
and North, testified before the Committees
under a grant of immunity. Calling North the
Contras' "quartermaster," Owen testified that
he had delivered envelope full of cash from
North's office safe to Contra leaders in
Washington and Central America in 1984-85, at
a time when a Congressional ban on u.s. aid
to the Contras were in effect. owen's
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testimony was the most explicit to date in
specifying the direct role North played
in keeping the Contras funded.
5/15/87

After months of denying that he knew
specifics about private aid to the Contras,
Reagan tells a group of Southern journalists
that he had been regularly briefed on Contra
aid because it was "my idea to begin with."

5/19/87

Adolfo Calero, head of largest Contra
faction, appears before the Joint
Congressional Committee. His testimony
focuses largely on allegations that
North had used about $2,000 in traveler's
checks from Contra funds for apparently
personal expenses, including snow tires and
women's stockings. Despite the relatively
small sums involved, the suggestion that
North might have personally profited from the
Contras overshadowed Calero's other
statements. He revealed that he had worked
closely with the CIA.

5/20-21/87

Singlaub takes the stand at the Congressional
hearings. He claims that Assistant Secretary
of State Elliott Abrams had agreed to assure
two foreign governments--identified elsewhere
as Taiwan and South Korea--that Singlaub had
the administration's approval in soliciting
aid from them for the Contras. The
Committees then hear testimony from three
wealthy donors to Contra causes: Joseph Coors
Co.; Ellen st. John Garwood, an elderly
heiress to the Anderson, Clayton & Co.
fortune; and William O'Boyle, heir to a Texas
oil fortune. Garwood and O'Boyle described
meeting with North and fund-raiser Carl
Channell to solicit money directly.
According to Garwood, Channell
promised that, for $300,000, the donor would
get a private, 15-minute meeting with
President Reagan.

6/2-3/87

Elliott Abrams appears before the
Congressional Committees. His testimony
focuses almost entirely on whether he had
intentionally deceived the Senate
Intelligence Committee Nov. 25, 1986, just
as the scandal broke. He admits that he had
left a misleading impression with the
committee, but insists that his statements
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head been technically correct and that he had
not intentionally deceived the senators. He
also contradicts testimony given by Singlaub,
saying that he had not met with Sing1aub

before the general's trip to Asia.
6/3-4/87

Testifying under a grant of limited immunity,
Albert Hakim, Secord's business partner,
appeared before the committees. Considered
the person most familiar with the intricate
financial arrangements behind the scandal,
Hakim detailed for the committees the
disposition of some of the profits
left over from the sale of u.s. arms to Iran
--those that were not diverted to the
Contras. Hakim said that the structure of
front corporations and numbered bank accounts
had become so intricate that even he, who had
set it up, was often confused. The payment
that attracted the most attention was
$200,000 in an account that Hakim said was
set up for North's family shortly before
North travelled to Teheran on a secret,
unsuccessful mission to rescue u.s. hostages
held in Lebanon. Hakim himself made no
secret of the fact that he was motivated by
profit.

6/8/87

Bretton Sciaroni, counsel to the President's
Intelligence oversight Board, testifies
before the Congressional Committees.
Sciaroni had written the legal opinion cited
by White House officials, including President
Reagan, to support their claim that the
Boland amendment banning covert aid to
the Contras did not apply to the NSC. The
questions focused on his qualifications as a
lawyer and the thoroughness of his
investigation of Boland. Sciaroni admits
that he had failed the California bar exam
twice and the District of Columbia exam twice
before passing the bar in Pennsylvania, where
he had never lived or worked. He also
acknowledges that his 1985 legal opinion,
his first such project as attorney, was based
on brief talks with North and NSC lawyer
Cmdr. Paul Thompson, and on quick review of
documents that Thompson said were sufficient.
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6/8-9/87

Fawn Hall testifies before the Congressional
Committees. She offers few new details about
her role in the scandal. Hall defends her
actions in altering, shredding, and smuggling
out certain documents. "Sometimes you have
to go above the written law," she said.

7/7-14/87

Lt. Col. Oliver North begins his long-awaited
testimony before the House and Senate
Committees, saying that he believes that all
his activities as a member of the NSC staff
from 1981 through 1986 had been authorized by
his superiors. He admits deceiving Congress
and misusing some funds from the sale of arms
to Iran, but he cites national security and
the safety of his family to justify those
actions. North, testifying under a grant of
immunity and under a complex agreement worked
out with the committees, says that he never
"personally discussed" the diversion of funds
with Reagan, but had "assumed that the
President was aware of what I was doing and
had, through my superiors, approved it."

7/15-21/87

Rear Adm. John Poindexter tells Congressional
panel that he never told the President about
the diversion of funds from arms transactions
with Iran to the Contra rebels fighting the
Nicaraguan government. Poindexter says that
he had authorized the controversial diversion
and deliberately kept Reagan in the dark in
order to "provide some future deniability for
the President if it ever leaked out."

7/23-24/87

Secretary of State George Shultz testifies
before the Congressional Committees that his
strong opposition to the secret arms sales to
Iran had sparked a "battle royal" and
"guerilla warfare" within the White House.
He angrily testifies that Poindexter,
McFarlane and Casey had lied to him and
withheld information from President Reagan in
order to continue the Iranian initiative and
ultimately protect themselves. Shultz denies
charges that he had deliberately kept himself
uninformed about details of the Iran
operation and the covert effort to resupply
the Contras, and then tried to distance
himself from the policies once the scandal
broke. He says he had argued strenuously
against the arms sales and worked to try to
end them from the inside.
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7/28-29/87

Attorney General Edwin Meese defends his own
brief probe of the Iran arms affair, telling
the committees that funds from the arms sales
to Iran had been diverted to the Contras, but
admits that he had failed to ask some
critical questions of key participants.

7/30-31/87

Former White House Chief of staff Donald
Regan testifies that when no hostages were
released following a February 1986 shipment
of arms to Iran, Reagan felt that "we'd been
had."

7/31-8/3/87

Secretary of Defense Weinberger testifies
before the Congressional panels that he had
repeatedly tried to stop the arms sales to
Iran and that he thought he had succeeded
each time, only to discover that White House
officials had deceived him in order to keep
the operation going.

8/3/87
8/12/87

Joint Congressional Committees conclude the
public segment of their hearings.
Responding to the recently concluded
congressional hearings in a nationally
broadcast address, President Reagan stated,
"Our original initiative got all tangled up
in the sale of arms, and the sale of arms got
tangled up with the hostages. • • • I let my
preoccupation with the hostages intrude into
areas where it didn't belong."

11/17/87

The Joint Congressional Committees
investigating the Iran-Contra arms scandal
submit their final report.

3/11/88

McFarlane pleads guilty to four counts of
withholding information from Congress.

3/16/88

Indictments returned against North,
Poindexter, Hakim, and Secord.

APPENDIX B
PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO THE TOWER COMMISSSION REPORT
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Appendix B
President's response to the Tower Commission Report
Carried on network television March 4, 1987
My fellow Americans, I've spoken to you from this
historic office on many occasions and about many things.
The power of the Presidency is often thought to reside
within this Oval Office.

Yet it doesn't rest here; it rests

in you, the American people, and in your trust.
Your trust is what gives a President his powers of
leadership and his personal strength, and it's what I want
to talk to you about this evening.
For the past three months, I've been sitting silent on
the revelations about Iran.

You must have been thinking,

"Well, why doesn't he tell us what's happening?

Why doesn't

he just speak to us as he has in the past when we've faced
troubles or tragedies?"

Others of you, I guess, were

thinking, "What is he doing hiding out in the White House?"
The reason I haven't spoken to you before now is this:
You deserved the truth.

And, as frustrating as the waiting

has been, I felt it was improper to come to you with sketchy
reports, or possibly even erroneous statements, which would
then have to be corrected, creating even more doubt and
confusion.

There's been enough of that.

I've paid a price for my silence in terms of your trust
and confidence.

But I have had to wait, as have you, for

the complete story.
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That's why I appointed Ambassador David Abshire as my
special counselor to help get out the thousands of documents
to the various investigations.

And I appointed a special

review board, the Tower board, which took on the chore of
pulling the truth together for me and getting to the bottom
of things.

It has now issued its findings.

I'm often accused of being an optimist, and it's true I
had to hunt pretty hard to find any good news in the board's
report.

As you know, it's well-stocked with criticisms,

which I'll discuss in a moment, but I was very relieved to
read this sentence, "· . . The board is convinced that the
President does indeed want the full story to be told."
And that will continue to be my pledge to you as the
other investigations go forward.
I want to thank the members of the panel--former
Senator John Tower, former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie,
and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft.

They

have done the nation, as well as me personally, a great
service by submitting a report of such integrity and depth.
They have my genuine and enduring gratitude.
I've studied the board's report.

Its findings are

honest, convincing and highly critical, and I accept them.
And tonight I want to share with you my thoughts on these
findings and report to you on the actions I'm taking to
implement the board's recommendations.
First, let me say I take full responsibility for my own
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actions and for those of my Administration.

As angry as I

may be about activities undertaken without my knowledge, I
am still accountable for those activities.

As disappointed

as I may be in some who served me, I am still the one who
must answer to the American people for this behavior.

And

as personally distasteful as I find secret bank accounts and
diverted funds, well, as the Navy would say, this happened
on my watch.
Let's start with the part that is the most
controversial.

A few months ago I told the American people

I did not trade arms for hostages.

My heart and my best

intentions still tell me that is true, but the facts and the
evidence tell me it is not.
As the Tower board reported, what began as a strategic
opening to Iran deteriorated in its implementation into
trading arms for hostages.

This runs counter to my own

beliefs, to Administration policy and to the original
strategy we had in mind.
but no excuses.

There are reasons why it happened

It was a mistake.

I undertook the original Iran initiative in order to
develop relations with those who might assume leadership in
a post-Khomeini Government.

It's clear from the board's

report, however, that I let my personal concern for the
hostages spill over into the geopolitical strategy of
reaching out to Iran.

I asked so many questions about the

hostages' welfare that I didn't ask enough about the
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specifics of the total Iran plan.
Let me say to the hostage families, we have not given
up.

We never will, and I promise you we'll use every

legitimate means to free your loved ones from captivity.
But I must also caution that those Americans who freely
remain in such dangerous areas must know that they're
responsible for their own safety.
Now, another major aspect of the Board's findings
regards the transfer of funds to the Nicaraguan contras.
The Tower board wasn't able to find out what happened to
this money, so the facts here will be left to the continuing
investigations of the court-appointed independent counsel
and the two Congressional investigating committees.

I'm

confident the truth will come out about this matter as well.
As I told the Tower board, I didn't know about any
diversion of funds to the contras.

But as President, I

cannot escape responsibility.
Much has been said about my management style, a style
that's worked successfully for me during eight years as
governor of California and for most of my presidency.

The

way I work is to identify the problem, find the right
individuals to do the job and then let them go to it.
found this invariably brings out the best in people.

I've
They

seem to rise to their full capability, and in the long run
you get more done.
When it came to managing the N.S.C. staff, let's face
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it, my style didn't match its previous track record.
already begun correcting this.

I've

As a start, yesterday I met

with the entire professional staff of the National Security
Council.

I defined for them the values I want to guide the

national security policies of this country.

I told them

that I wanted a policy that was as justifiable and
understandable in public as it was in secret.

I wanted a

policy that reflected the will of the Congress as well as
the White House.

And I told them that there'll be no more

freelancing by individuals when it comes to our national
security.
You've heard a lot about the staff of the National
Security Council in recent months.

I can tell you, they are

good and dedicated Government employees, who put in long
hours for the nation's benefit.

They are eager and anxious

to serve their country.
One thing still upsetting me, however, is that no one
kept proper records of meetings or decisions.

This led to

my failure to recollect whether I approved an arms shipment
before or after the fact.
say specifically when.

I did approve it; I just can't

Rest assured, there's plenty of

record-keeping now going on at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.
For nearly a week now, I've been studying the board's
report.

I want the American people to know that this

wrenching ordeal of recent months has not been in vain.

I

endorse every one of the Tower board's recommendations.

In
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fact, I'm going beyond its recommendations, so as to put the
house in even better order.
I'm taking action in three basic areas--personnel,
national security policy and the process for making sure
that the system works.
First, personnel.

I've brought in an accomplished and

highly respected new team here at the White House.

They

bring new blood, new energy, and new credibility and
experience.
Former Senator Howard Baker, my new chief of staff,
possesses a breadth of legislative and foreign affairs
skills that's impossible to match.

I'm hopeful that his

experience as minority and majority leader of the Senate can
help us forge a new partnership with the Congress,
especially on foreign and national security policies.

I'm

genuinely honored that he's given up his own Presidential
aspirations to serve the country as my chief of staff.
Frank Carlucci, my new national security adviser, is
respected for his experience in government and trusted for
his judgment and counsel.

Under him, the N.S.C. staff is

being rebuilt with proper management discipline.

Already,

almost half the N.s.c. professional staff is comprised of
new people.
Yesterday I nominated William Webster, a man of
sterling reputation, to be Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Webster has served as Director of
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the F.B.I. and as a

u.s. District Court judge.

He

understands the meaning of "Rule of Law."
So that his knowledge of national security matters can
be available to me on a continuing basis, I will also
appoint John Tower to serve as a member of my Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.
I am considering other changes in personnel, and I'll
move more furniture as I see fit in the weeks and months
ahead.
Second, in the area of national security policy, I have
ordered the N.S.C. to begin a comprehensive review of all
covert operations.
I have also directed that any covert activity be in
support of clear policy objectives and in compliance with
American values.

I expect a covert policy that if Americans

saw it on the front page of their newspaper, they'd say,
"That makes sense."
I have had issued a directive prohibiting the N.s.c.
staff itself from undertaking covert operations--no if's,
and's or but's.
I have asked Vice President Bush to reconvene his task
force on terrorism to review our terrorist policy in light
of the events that have occurred.
Third, in terms of the process of reaching national
security decisions, I am adopting in total the Tower
report's model of how the N.s.c. process and staff should
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work.

I am directing Mr. Carlucci to take the necessary

steps to make that happen.

He will report back to me on

further reforms that might be needed.
I've created the post of N.S.C. legal adviser to assure
a greater sensitivity to matters of law.
I am also determined to make the Congressional
oversight process work.

Proper procedures for consultation

with the Congress will be followed, not only in letter but
in spirit.
Before the end of March I will report to the Congress
on all the steps I've taken in line with the Tower board's
conclusions.
Now what should happen when you make a mistake is this:
You take your knocks, you learn your lessons and then you
move on.

That's the healthiest way to deal with a problem.

This in no way diminishes the importance of the other
continuing investigations, but the business of our country
and out people must proceed.

I've gotten this message from

Republicans and Democrats in Congress, from allies around
the world--and if we're reading the signals right, even from
the Soviets.

And, of course, I've heard the message from

you, the American people.
You know, by the time you reach my age, you've made
plenty of mistakes if you've live your life properly.
you learn.

You put things in perspective.

energies together.

You change.

So

You pull your

You go forward.
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My fellow Americans, I have a great deal that I want to
accomplish with you and for you over the next two years,
and, the Lord willing, that's exactly what I intend to do.
Goodnight and God bless you.

